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SHOW ME THE (DATA ABOUT THE) MONEY! 
 
Nizan Geslevich Packin* 
 
Abstract 
Information about consumers, their money, and what they do with it 
is the lifeblood of the flourishing financial technology (“FinTech”) sector. 
Historically, highly regulated banks jealously protected this data. 
However, consumers themselves now share their data with businesses 
more than ever before. These businesses monetize and use the data for 
countless prospects, often without the consumers’ actual consent. 
Understanding the dimensions of this recent phenomenon, more and more 
consumer groups, scholars, and lawmakers have started advocating for 
consumers to have the ability to control their data as a modern imperative. 
This ability is tightly linked to the concept of open banking—an initiative 
that allows consumers to control and share their banking data with service 
providers as they see fit. But in the U.S., banks have threatened to block 
the servers of tech companies and data aggregators—business entities that 
serve as the middlemen connecting FinTech companies and banks, 
enabling consumers to get more financial services—from accessing their 
customers’ data even if the customers agree to it. With no regulation or 
accepted standards for the ethical gathering and use of data, banks argue 
that limiting access helps them protect their clients’ privacy, improve their 
accounts’ safety, and promote consumer protection principles. Banks 
claim that FinTech apps collect more data than needed, store it insecurely, 
and sell it to others. 
But the motivation of the big banks in advocating for such limitations 
may not be so pure. Banks do not want to relinquish competitive 
advantages, lose customers, or be held liable for data or fund losses. 
Witnessing resistance, tech companies are not sitting idly by waiting for 
banks to limit their data access. Instead, they are working on ways to 
outsmart banks’ blocking technology and use data aggregation services 
as a middleman. They also extended the fight into Washington, where 
regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) are noticing how 
technology impacts consumer data flows and credit reporting issues. 
Advocating for consumers’ rights to control data, tech companies lobby 
for open banking. 
                                                   
* © 2020 Nizan Geslevich Packin. Associate Professor of Law at Baruch College, City 
University of New York, and an Affiliated Faculty at Indiana University Bloomington’s 
Program on Governance of the Internet & Cybersecurity. A special thanks to the participants 
of the 2020 PLSC, as well as the 2020 National Business Law Scholars Conference, for their 
helpful comments. Thanks also to Peter Kim for the invaluable input. 
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The legal status of third-parties’ right to access consumers’ financial 
data is anchored in the EU’s recently adopted Payment Services Directive 
II. In the U.S., however, the approach to open banking is market-based, in 
which data aggregators have become key players without the notice of 
consumers. Realizing this, in 2018, the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) issued a warning about the dangers of consumers 
sharing their account data with data aggregators to access apps, and in 
2019, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) inspector 
general released a report expressing concerns about data aggregators.  
The status-quo could change. The previously ignored Section 1033 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act “provides for consumer rights to access financial 
account and account-related data in usable electronic forms.” Yet, the 
section’s applicability to third-parties, which access consumer data with 
consumers’ permission as opposed to consumers directly accessing their 
own data, is not clear. Similarly, regulation must address data 
aggregators’ business operations, including issues such as anti-
competition, obtaining consumers’ informed consent to data sharing, and 
data security, given the credit card companies’ recent attempts to acquire 
the biggest data aggregators. This Article is the first to direct attention to 
data aggregators—an overlooked category within the financial services 
industry. By analyzing financial regulation and privacy law, this Article 
examines data aggregators’ relationships with banks, tech companies, and 
consumers. It provides a comparative lens between top-down and bottom-
up regulatory approaches to data sharing, and draws from an Australian 
law that creates a singular consumer right that enables all institutions to 
connect to other data systems. It also suggests regulating data 
aggregators as gatekeepers in ways analogous to credit rating agencies. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When a consumer downloads a FinTech app, such as Venmo1 or RobinHood,2 
on her smartphone then logs into it, she is likely not interfacing with her bank but 
providing her bank account login and password to a data aggregator. Frequently, the 
data aggregator stores the login credentials and uses them to continually log into the 
consumer’s bank account to copy all personally identifiable data, ranging from 
transaction information to account numbers. Additionally, once it has accessed 
consumer data, the data aggregator can share, sell, or even carelessly dispose of her 
information with or without the consumer’s knowledge. 
These open banking practices of accessing, sharing, transferring, and selling 
data raise many concerns as they entail great risk. Data is valuable. The more data a 
company has about an individual, the more power it has over that individual’s 
decision-making. In today’s big data-driven economy, the companies with the most 
data have the most power. Consequently, people’s ability to maintain control over 
their data has become a modern imperative, especially in consumer finance, where 
technological advances impact consumers’ transfer of data and affect credit scoring 
issues.3 In particular, such technological advances enable American consumers, who 
                                                   
1 Venmo is a non-banking business entity that offers peer-to-peer payment services and 
a digital money transfer network, accessible via a smartphone app. See generally Kelly 
McNulty, How Venmo Works and What You Need to Know Before You Use It, 
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 17, 2019, 10:54 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-
venmo-works-and-what-to-know-before-you-use-it-2019-04-09 [https://perma.cc/XY89-
79MB].  
2  RobinHood is a FinTech investment app that helped introduce a “generation of 
investors to the market, but without much in the way of additional education.” See Matthew 
J. Razzano, An Unsafe Sandbox: Fintech Innovation at the Expense of Consumer 
Protection?, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 132, 136 (2019). 
3 See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the 
Right to be Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339 (2016) (explaining the 
consequences of implementing a social credit system in finance). 
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spend on average five hours a day on their smartphones,4 to allow third-parties to 
access their personal financial data by using different technologies.5 But the problem 
is beyond the scope of certain defined contexts, such as those protected by privacy 
or data protection laws, which hardly reflects issues discussed in current privacy 
theories.6 The rights and duties of various parties interested in individuals’ personal 
data in computer databases are unclear.7 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding third-party rights over individuals’ personal 
information, and even more so since the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed more 
individuals to use FinTech services on their smartphones,8 consumers continue to 
transact with FinTech companies as they offer innovative services and products. For 
example, according to a report by the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion 
Database, three-quarters of the world’s poor in 2011 did not have a bank account for 
a variety of reasons, such as costs, travel distances, and difficulties associated with 
opening an account,9 but can use their mobile-phones for financial services. Even in 
                                                   
4 Eileen Brown, Americans Spend Far More Time on Their Smartphones than They 
Think, ZDNET (Apr. 28, 2019, 1:15 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/americans-spend-
far-more-time-on-their-smartphones-than-they-think/ [https://perma.cc/7FFF-3EES] 
(reporting that “[t]he average American spends 5.4 hours a day on their phone”).  
5  Third-parties typically access personal financial data using (i) an application 
programming interface (“API”), or (ii) screen scrapers. APIs—sets of code that give third-
parties secure access to their back-end data—serve as channels for developers to get to the 
data and build their own products and services around it. Put differently, a screen scraper is 
a “software capable of automatically contacting various web sites and extracting relevant 
information.” See Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 383 (2018) (quoting Shea ex rel. The Am. 
Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). In banking, the terms refer to a 
non-bank that offers services and obtains secure credentials of bank customers to access their 
accounts, gets their financial data, and saves it in an app via an automated process. See id. at 
373–74. 
6 JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 7.09 
(4th ed. 2020). 
7 Jane K. Winn & James Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer—The Emerging Law of 
Commercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 BUS. LAW. 213, 214–15 (2000). 
8 See, e.g., New Data: More than Forty Percent of U.S. Consumers Shop Through 
Digital Channels . . . And Stay There, PYMNTS (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/ 
news/merchant-innovation/2020/new-data-more-than-forty-percent-of-u-s-consumers-shop 
-through-digital-channels-and-stay-there/ [https://perma.cc/Y9DU-FLGY]; FSB: 
Outsourcing Banking Technology Could Pose ‘Systemic Risk,’ PYMNTS (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.pymnts.com/news/banking/2020/fsb-risk-of-outsourcing-bank-technology/ 
[https://perma.cc/WQD6-R4C3] (“The pandemic may have also accelerated the trend 
towards greater reliance on certain third-party technologies.” (quoting the Financial Stability 
Board)). 
9 Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Leora Klapper, Measuring Financial Inclusion: The Global 
Findex Database 11–18 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 6025, 2012); 
see also Matthew B. Gross, Jeanne M. Hogarth & Maximilian D. Schmeiser, Use of 
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the U.S., a relatively large number of households live at least partially outside the 
mainstream financial system.10 Such households’ lack of access to the financial 
system contributes to financial disparity, tragically impacts consumers’ ability to 
navigate the twists and turns of life, and prevents economic recovery.11 But, thanks 
to the emergence of new innovative technologies that facilitate connectivity and 
mobile financial transactions, tech companies and social networks have successfully 
set their foot on the market for underserved populations and offer services to these 
individuals.12 Moreover, even consumers that are part of the traditional financial 
service system, have started to rely more and more on FinTech services. Research 
shows that in the U.S., twenty percent of families with traditional bank accounts rely 
on alternative financial services.13 
Similarly, FinTech solutions enable “data portability,” which refers to 
consumers’ ability to transfer digital information from one place to another quickly 
and easily. However, in the absence of legislation, companies might not facilitate it, 
and the consumers will not have the ability to transfer their data.14 Aside from 
                                                   
Financial Services by the Unbanked and Underbanked and the Potential for Mobile 
Financial Services Adoption, 98 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/mobile_financial_services_201209.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CCF-
D9M3].  
10  CONSUMER & CMTY. DEV. RSCH. SECTION, FED. RSRV. BD., CONSUMERS AND 
MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 5 (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consum 
ers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201403.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMR8-DGKX]. 
11 See Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Remarks at The New America 
Foundation Forum: Economic and Financial Inclusion in 2011: What It Means for Americans 
and Our Economic Recovery (June 29, 2011) (detailing why broad inclusion matters to 
economic recovery, and stating that “effective inclusion in the financial marketplace depends 
upon a strong regulatory framework, active market participation, and an expansion in public 
financial literacy”). 
12 See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social 
Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211 (2016) [hereinafter 
Packin & Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks] (discussing the rise of non-bank 
FinTech start-ups); Fintech: Examining Digitization, Data, and Technology: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 115th Cong. 4 (2018) (Steven Boms, 
President, Allon Advocacy, LLC, on behalf of the Consumer Fin. Data Rights Grp.), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Boms%20Testimony%209-18-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8XR4-48J4] (“Twenty percent of adult Americans are underbanked by the 
traditional financial services system and almost nine million American households are 
entirely unbanked. For these consumers, third party, technology-based tools can provide 
vital, affordable access to a financial system that has left them behind.”). 
13 Jason Furman, Financial Inclusion in the United States, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 
10, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/06/10/financial-
inclusion-united-states [https://perma.cc/RCA9-RBTQ]. People use FinTech services for, 
inter alia, things like faster payments, robo-advisers, and wealth management tools. See 
CONSUMER & CMTY. DEV. RSCH. SECTION, supra note 10, at 21. 
14  Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the 
CFPB, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531, 534 (2018) (discussing data portability). The EU Payment 
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promoting goals such as financial inclusion, internet connectivity, data portability, 
and enhancement of other information-related rights, FinTech companies are 
successful because they make things easier for consumers. They offer user-friendly 
products and services and enable consumers to save and spend efficiently, improving 
their customer experience.15 This is important because we live in an era where 
customers demand top-notch experiences. 16  But since banks are not technology 
companies and have traditionally not focused on offering more custom-tailored 
experiences,17 a third of all banking customers in 2019 used external custom-tailored 
                                                   
Account Directive grants the right of bank account data portability to EU consumers. 
Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the 
Comparability of Fees Related to Payment Accounts, Payment Account Switching and 
Access to Payment Accounts with Basic Features, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 214. Similarly, the 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) grants consumers the right to get a copy of 
the information they have provided. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. Likewise, under the second Payment Services 
Directive (“PSDII”), banks must share access to their customer account data with their 
competitors. Directive 2015/2366/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2015 on Payment Services in the Internal Market, Amending Directives 
2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, and 
repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35. 
15 See LAUREN SAUNDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FINTECH AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION: A SNAPSHOT 2 (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/cons-protection/rpt-
fintech-and-consumer-protection-a-snapshot-march2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y94E-5L7J] 
(“Fintech products and services have the potential to provide important benefits to 
consumers. They promise to lower costs, promote financial inclusion, help people avoid fees 
and comparison shop, improve personal financial management, and build assets and 
wealth.”). 
16 The majority of consumers in the financial services industry would likely cease to 
buy from or transact with a business—specifically a bank—if a competitor, such as a FinTech 
company, offers a better experience. See Customer Expectations Hit All-Time Highs, 
SALESFORCE RESEARCH, https://www.salesforce.com/research/customer-expectations/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q2VR-KQN4] (last visited July 6, 2020) (finding that 76% of customers 
thought it was easier than ever to take their business elsewhere, as disruptive companies 
leverage technology to offer the personalized, valuable, immediate, and superior experience 
customers have grown to expect from businesses they engage with). 
17 Consumer expectations for customization are important. A study showed that 70% 
of customers say understanding how they use products and services is very important to 
winning their business, 59% of customers say tailored engagement based on prior 
interactions is very important to winning their business, and customers are more than twice 
as likely to view personalized offers as significant versus insignificant. Id.; see also Sam 
Stewart, Philippe Soussan, Pierre Roussel, Muriel Dupas, Juan Uribe & Frédérique Brugère, 
Retail Banking Distribution 2025: Up Close and Personal, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (Sept. 
26, 2019), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2019/retail-banking-distribution-2025-up-
close-personal.aspx [https://perma.cc/TK6L-7J65] (explaining how personalization of 
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FinTech apps.18 Likewise, nearly two-thirds of millennials would share their data in 
return for more personalized service.19 
In noticing this trend in consumer preferences early on, technology companies 
and banks have started jockeying over who controls—and has access to—consumer 
financial data. This conflict is particularly noticeable in the U.S., where some banks 
threaten to block technology companies’ servers from accessing their customers’ 
financial data. The banks argue that access limits are how they can best look out for 
their clients’ interests, protect their privacy, improve account safety,20 and promote 
consumer protection principles. 21  The banks claim FinTech companies do not 
protect consumer privacy, or prevent potential discrimination that can stem from 
using, sharing, and selling data that is then analyzed for various purposes, and that 
they collect more data than needed, store it insecurely, and sell it to third-parties.22 
Between 2016 to 2020, the power struggle over consumer financial data has 
escalated. After several banks, such as JPMorgan Chase and Capital One, made it 
clear that they intend to control FinTech companies’ access to data, global media 
outlets started covering the tension.23 Serving as a poster child for this tension in 
                                                   
customer service can help banks increase profitability by up to 25% and how customers 
expect smart digital banking that is tailored to their immediate needs). 
18  Why Open Banking Represents a Seismic Shift for Fintech, KNOWLEDGE @ 
WHARTON (Jan. 16, 2019) [hereinafter Seismic Shift], https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article/open-banking-represents-seismic-shift-fintech/ [https://perma.cc/3V5L-LZK6]. 
19  See Devon McGinnis, Please Take My Data: Why Consumers Want More 
Personalized Marketing, SALESFORCE BLOG (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.salesforce.com/ 
blog/2016/12/consumers-want-more-personalized-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/GY6C-
4NNU]. 
20 Steven Harras, FDIC Watchdog Worries About Unsupervised Logins for Customer 
Bank Data, CONG. Q. ROLL CALL, Mar. 5, 2019, 2019 WL 1032055 (describing the difficulty 
in improving account safety considering as much as forty percent of online logins to bank 
accounts are not from actual customers, but from data aggregators that have been authorized 
access to their personal information). 
21 Nizan Geslevich Packin, Big Banks vs. Silicon Valley Startups: Whose Customer 
Financial Data Is It Anyway?, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/nizangpackin/2019/04/19/big-banks-vs-silicon-valley-startups-whose-customer-finan 
cial-data-is-it-anyway/#31c9768b5155 [https://perma.cc/T7VJ-LK8J]; Ben Isaacson, As 
Mobile Apps Proliferate, Data Protection Has to Keep Up, AM. BANKER (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/as-mobile-apps-proliferate-data-protection-has-
to-keep-up [https://perma.cc/7WGF-SSJN] (discussing tradeoffs that prioritize convenient 
services over safety and privacy, and the significant risks that result). 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., Robin Sidel, Big Banks Lock Horns with Personal-Finance Web Portals; 
J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo Are Snarling the Flow of Data to Popular Websites that Help 
Consumers Manage Their Finances, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:30 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-lock-horns-with-personal-finance-web-portals-
1446683450 [https://perma.cc/M3CH-ZQMR]; Frances Schwartzkopff, Banks Facing Data 
Crisis May Need Political Help, Denmark Warns, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-08/banks-may-need-political-help-to-
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early 2019 was Cushion, a startup that helps users win refunds in fees charged by 
financial institutions using a chatbot.24 According to its statements, Cushion needed 
very broad permission to request data, but banks did not want to share the requested 
data. 25  Similarly, in December 2019, news broke that many of PNC Bank’s 
customers were having difficulties connecting their bank accounts to the Venmo 
app.26 These customers could not access PayPal’s mobile payment service due to the 
rivalry among banks, FinTech companies, and the middlemen—data aggregators—
that connect banks and FinTech companies.27 
As suggested in the tensions above, the banks’ motivation to limit technology 
companies’ access to data may not be so pure. First, banks are forced to give a 
competitive advantage to the financial industry’s new entrants,28 and laws such as 
the European Union’s PSDII entail a uni-directional flow of consumer data. This 
means banks must share access to their customers’ data with FinTech companies, 
but FinTech companies are not required to share their information with banks. 
Second, banks do not wish to be liable for losses of funds or data, but, under current 
rules, banks are likely covering the losses for breaches. Moreover, many FinTech 
companies do not have the funds to cover losses, and some may be losing money 
and/or raising capital. This means either consumers will absorb their losses for 
                                                   
survive-big-tech-a-nordic-view [https://perma.cc/VRV3-NHEB] (explaining that “[f]irst 
there was the financial crisis of 2008. Then years of negative interest rates. Now, banks face 
what one financial regulator calls the ‘real game changer.’ . . . [T]he next big threat for banks 
is the rapid spread of big tech into financial services. The competitive tool is personal data 
and the playing field is far from even.”); see also Jennifer Surane, Big Banks’ Clampdown 
on Data Puts Silicon Valley Apps on Alert, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-26/jpmorgan-s-clampdown-on-data-
puts-silicon-valley-apps-on-alert [https://perma.cc/ZBB7-3J67]. 
24 Surane, supra note 23. 
25 Id. 
26 Yuka Hayashi, Venmo Glitch Opens Window on War Between Banks, Fintech Firms, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/venmo-glitch-opens-window-
on-war-between-banks-fintech-firms-11576319402 [https://perma.cc/6LPD-LC63]. 
27 Id.  
28 See generally Ryan Browne, Europe’s Banks Brace for a Huge Overhaul that Throws 
Open the Doors to Their Data, CNBC (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:01 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/25/psd2-europes-banks-brace-for-new-eu-data-sharing-
rules.html [https://perma.cc/687D-9VFA]. In terms of customer data management in the 
financial sector: 
 
Banks have long been at an advantage when it comes to data on their customers. 
From current accounts to credit cards, established lenders have access to vast 
amounts of information that financial technology (fintech) competitors could only 
dream of . . . . that could all be about to change . . . . banks operating in the 
European Union will be forced to open up their customer data to third party firms 
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oversharing personal data, or they would expect deep-pocketed banks to do so, 
which makes banks prefer to err on the side of caution and limit access to data.29 
Third, banks are lagging behind FinTech companies in customer service, customized 
experience,30 and deliverance of innovative offerings,31 often because the banks are 
heavily regulated and simply cannot offer the same things as the FinTech companies. 
Unlike banks and FinTech entities, the data aggregators have received minimal 
attention from regulators.32 Yet data aggregators have a growing role in the financial 
ecosystem 33  and include Plaid, Intuit, Finicity, Envestnet|Yodlee, 
Morningstar/ByAllAccounts, Fiserv/CashEdge, and MX. 34  Data aggregators are 
barely subject to any regulation,35 have received little scholarly attention, and most 
                                                   
29 See Hayashi, supra note 26. 
30 See Customer Expectations, supra note 16.  
31 Id. (stating that 56% of customers actively seek to buy from the most innovative 
businesses, which consistently introduce new products and services; 63% of customers 
expect businesses to offer new products and services more frequently than ever before; and 
66% of customers say businesses now need to do more to impress them with new offerings). 
32 Investor Alert: Know Before You Share: Be Mindful of Data Aggregation Risks, FIN. 
REGUL. AUTH. (Mar. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Know Before You Share], https://www.finra.org/ 
investors/alerts/be-mindful-data-aggregation-risks [https://perma.cc/ZNH9-HTUC]. For 
consumers looking for smarter financial solutions: 
 
There are many companies—often called data aggregators—ready to help you 
organize your financial life. However, before you share your account information 
and other sensitive financial details with data aggregators, it pays to know how 
these services operate, and how to protect yourself from potential privacy and 
security risks.  
 
Id. 
33 See generally Kimberly L. Wierzel, If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them: Data 
Aggregators and Financial Institutions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 457 (2001) (explaining that 
data aggregators enable consumers to turn over their different accounts’ login credentials at 
various banks to one operator, which in turn lets them view all of their data from one site). 
34 See MX Technologies Inc., A List of Financial Data Aggregators in the United 
States, MX (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.mx.com/moneysummit/a-list-of-financial-data-
aggregators-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/V3VE-LRHW]. The report mentions eight 
data aggregators—the seven stated above and Quovo, which was acquired by Plaid in 2019. 
See Penny Crosman, What Happens If Mastercard and Visa Gobble Up All the Data 
Aggregators, AM. BANKER (June 29, 2020, 3:39 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
news/what-happens-if-mastercard-and-visa-gobble-up-all-the-data-aggregators [https://per 
ma.cc/CZ4M-B36S] [hereinafter Crosman, Mastercard and Visa Gobble Up]. Additionally, 
a “newer competitor in aggregation is Akoya, which spun off in February [2020] from 
Fidelity Investments and is now owned by Fidelity.” Id. 
35 Penny Crosman, Why a Clear Answer to the Data-Sharing Debate Remains Elusive, 
AM. BANKER (Feb. 23, 2017, 3:39 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-a-
clear-answer-to-the-data-sharing-debate-remains-elusive [https://perma.cc/66X3-57M4] 
[hereinafter Crosman, Data-Sharing Debate]. Experts have expressed concerns about how 
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consumers have never even heard of them or know what they do.36 It is remarkable 
how data aggregators became powerful without many of us noticing, especially 
considering “[w]hen aggregators access account numbers, many store them 
indefinitely, often unbeknownst to customers. This puts customers and their money 
at risk.”37 It is questionable whether consumers actually know what risks they are 
exposed to as a result of their data being shared between banks and different third-
parties.38 
Data aggregators are here to stay. In the U.S., there are thousands of banks and 
even more FinTech companies offering services to consumers that need data 
aggregators to communicate, transact, and trust each other while sharing data. 
FinTech companies’ data gathering is typically done by one of two ways: (i) screen-
scraping of public data from a website39; and (ii) APIs, a technology that enables 
                                                   
data aggregators are so minimally regulated given their significant role in the financial 
ecosystem: 
 
The data aggregators are very lightly regulated. They don’t have a lot of the strict, 
hard obligations banks and other institutions have[.] . . . That means there’s a lot 
of innovative stuff going on here, but lately the amount of data people are keeping 
around for big data uses has been troubling. 
 
Id. 
36 Penny Crosman, Is Finra’s Dire Warning About Data Aggregators on Target?, AM. 
BANKER (Apr. 9, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/is-finras-dire-
warning-about-data-aggregators-on-target [https://perma.cc/729J-42HW] [hereinafter 
Crosman, Finra’s Dire Warning] (explaining that data “[a]ggregators are almost always a 
middleman. When you use an online service or app or even a service from a provider that 
uses aggregation under the hood, there are very few end customers that realize the aggregator 
is acting on their behalf as their agent.”). 
37 Hayashi, supra note 26 (quotations omitted); see THE CLEARING HOUSE, CONSUMER 
SURVEY: FINANCIAL APPS AND DATA PRIVACY SURVEY 5–6 (2019), 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/New/TCH/Documents/Data-Privacy/2019-TCH-
ConsumerSurveyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H57-8PD9] [hereinafter CONSUMER 
SURVEY] (finding that, for example, only 21% of the surveyed consumers were aware that 
financial apps continue to have access to their data until they revoke their bank credentials). 
38 When surveyed, most consumers responded that they want the “seamless experience” 
of FinTech, and also the data security and privacy traditionally offered by banks. CONSUMER 
SURVEY, supra note 37, at 7–8. 
39  See, e.g., WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 6; Jeffrey Kenneth Hirschey, Symbiotic 
Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance of Data Scraping, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 897 
(2014) (discussing automated data collection on the Internet). Screen-scraping was recently 
held by the 9th Circuit not to constitute “hacking.” See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 
F.3d 985, 999 (9th Cir. 2019).  
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programmers to integrate data from one source into third-party apps, restrict how 
apps tap data, and contractually limit the data’s usages.40  
Visa understood the importance of financial data sharing, as well as data 
aggregators’ impact on innovative financial services, and in early 2020, it announced 
plans to purchase Plaid, the biggest data aggregator.41 Originally, Plaid stated that 
its goal was to enable FinTech companies to offer innovative services to consumers, 
thereby increasing competition among providers, lowering service costs, and 
enhancing consumer access to services.42 However, in May 2020, Plaid already 
changed course, declaring its plan to launch Plaid Exchange, a platform that puts 
banks, Visa’s biggest customers, in the driver’s seat.43 Specifically, Plaid Exchange 
is meant to let banks control data-sharing efforts, as it is “a bank product that will 
enable banks to expose APIs to a range of trusted FinTech developers.”44 Then, in 
June 2020, MasterCard reinforced the industry’s understanding of the critical role 
of data aggregators when it announced its plans to buy Finicity to compete with Visa 
and Plaid in the financial services race. 45  But in November 2020, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”)—after examining the Visa-Plaid deal—sued to block 
the $5.3 billion acquisition, citing competition concerns.46 The DOJ alleged that the 
largest card network buying the data aggregator would slow FinTech innovation and 
benefit only Visa and big banks.47 
                                                   
40 See, e.g., WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 6 (“The earliest examples of ‘Open API 
Banking’ appear to have emerged in the United States as innovative business models used 
by some banks.”).  
41 David Z. Morris & Jeff John Roberts, Visa’s New Monopoly, FORTUNE (Jan. 15, 
2020, 7:50 A.M.), https://fortune.com/2020/01/15/visas-new-monopoly/ [https://perma.cc/ 
S9WH-6738]. 
42 Id. This would make Plaid become a part of Visa, whose customers are big banks. 
Id.  
43 Tim Sloane, Visa Acquisition Prospect Plaid Intros Open Banking API Strategy that 
Mimics Mastercard’s, PAYMENTS J. (May 21, 2020), https://www.paymentsjournal.com/visa 
-acquisition-prospect-plaid-intros-open-banking-api-strategy-that-mimics-mastercards 
[https://perma.cc/JQ3F-GJNQ]. 
44 Id.  
45 See Laura Noonan, Mastercard to Buy US Open-Banking Group Finicity for $1bn, 
FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/0c42b31f-cbf3-4dd7-97ad-
3ec6ff2db00e [https://perma.cc/7KXL-72M5]. Mastercard’s $1 billion purchase of Finicity 
is a deal that expands its footprint in open banking. Id.  
46 Brent Kendall & AnnaMaria Andriotis, Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit 
Challenging Visa’s Planned Acquisition of Plaid, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2020, 3:38 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-files-antitrust-lawsuit-challenging-visa-s-
planned-acquisition-of-plaid-11604591434 [https://perma.cc/U96H-XG6C]. 
47 Id. (“[DOJ] alleg[ed] [that] the deal would eliminate the nascent but significant 
competitive threat that Plaid poses to Visa in the online debit market.”). Likewise, 
neutralizing Plaid would help Visa’s biggest customers—banks—as it could stop data 
aggregators from using bank customers’ data of the banks. Anna Hrushka, Visa’s Plaid Deal 
Faces Antitrust Scrutiny from Justice Department, BANKINGDIVE (Oct. 28, 2020), 
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This Article examines consumers’ ability to manage their financial data—an 
issue that is unclear in the U.S. unlike in other places in the world—and explores the 
roles of data aggregators, FinTech companies, and consumers in managing this data. 
In the U.S., the right to access financial data is affiliated with Section 1033 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank 
Act),48 which has not yet been interpreted by the judicial system or any government 
agency. But while the time has clearly come to regulate the issue of data sharing in 
the consumer finance context, lawmakers and government agencies that have 
commented on the topic failed to issue clear standards or binding rules and much 
uncertainty remains. First, in 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”)49 released a set of non-binding principles on consumer-authorized use of 
financial data.50 But the principles are broad, generic, and do not confirm whether 
Section 1033 preserves third-parties’ right to pull data directly from bank customers’ 
accounts.51 Second, a 2018 Department of the Treasury report embraced a similar 
approach. 52  Third, in 2018, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”)53 issued a warning to investors about data aggregators and their activities 
                                                   
https://www.bankingdive.com/news/visas-plaid-antitrust-department-of-justice/587939/ 
[https://perma.cc/5HH9-ES7M]. 
48 12 U.S.C. § 5301.  
49 Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 232, 237 (2018) [hereinafter Van Loo, Making Innovation More 
Competitive]. Van Loo explains how the CPFB came to life and its main goal, stating:  
 
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, banking regulators carried a dual mission of 
protecting consumers and ensuring financial stability. This pairing subordinated 
consumer protection to stability. To solve this problem in the wake of the 
subprime mortgage crisis, Congress launched a new agency, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau . . . . The CFPB took over most of stability regulators’ 
consumer protection powers but has no stability mission.  
 
Id. 
50 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER PROTECTION PRINCIPLES: CONSUMER-
AUTHORIZED FINANCIAL DATA SHARING AND AGGREGATION 3–5 (2017) [hereinafter CFPB 
CONSUMER PROTECTION], https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-
protection-principles_data-aggregation.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE69-87KQ]. 
51 Telis Demos, Fintech Startups Want to Save One Key Page of Dodd-Frank, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-startups-want-to-save-one-key-
page-of-dodd-frank-1486035001 [https://perma.cc/5VDV-8RDQ]. 
52 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 31 (2018) [hereinafter 
2018 Treasury Report]. 
53  ANDREW STOLTMANN & BENJAMIN P. EDWARDS, FINRA GOVERNANCE REVIEW: 
PUBLIC GOVERNORS SHOULD PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (2017) (explaining that 
FINRA “plays a vital role in regulating the securities industry”). FINRA describes itself as 
“an independent, not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress to protect America’s 
investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and honestly.” Id.  
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in the context of open banking and data portability,54 but never went beyond that. 
Fourth, in early 2019, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) inspector 
general expressed concerns about unsupervised logins for customer bank data.55 
Lastly, in 2020, the CFPB organized a symposium dedicated to financial data 
sharing, indicating that it might finally be on the regulators’ radar screen.56  
As this Article shows, the fight over the management of consumer financial 
data is focused on a type of potential harms that may flow from conduct in the data-
driven economy, and is not unique or limited to the U.S. The EU’s adoption of a top-
down financial regulation—the “open API banking” PSDII—is pro-innovation and 
anti-screen-scraping, but is still very one-sided,57 and addresses the issue of data 
sharing only in the context of payments. 58  In contrast, the U.S.’s market-led 
approach to open banking has resulted in banks,59 data aggregators, and FinTech 
                                                   
54 See Know Before You Share, supra note 32. 
55 The FDIC was created after the collapse of thousands of banks during the Great 
Depression, and it is the vehicle through which the federal government insures deposits if an 
FDIC-backed institution fails. John T. Holden, Trifling and Gambling with Virtual Money, 
25 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 41, 52, n.54 (2018). In that context, Steven Harras recommends:  
 
Policymakers and examiners “must keep pace with the adoption of new financial 
technology to assess its impact on the safety and soundness of institutions and the 
stability of the banking system.” That includes the practices of data aggregators 
acting as middlemen between fintech companies and banks . . . . [because] 
however much banks seek to limit outsider access to consumer information, data 
aggregators can still collect consumer data for use by fintech developers without 
the permission or knowledge of the bank. 
 
See Harras, supra note 20. (quoting OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDIC, TOP MANAGEMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FACING THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 7 
(2019), https://www.fdicoig.gov/report-release/top-management-and-performance-
challenges-facing-federal-deposit-insurance [https://perma.cc/BZ3Y-QF6B]). 
56 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUREAU SYMPOSIUM: CONSUMER ACCESS TO 
FINANCIAL RECORDS: A SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS (July 2020), https://files.consumer 
finance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_bureau-symposium-consumer-access-financial-records_repo 
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/73MC-DCSS].  
57 See Seismic Shift, supra note 18. 
58  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT ON OPEN BANKING AND 
APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES 5 (2019), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d486. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/LKM9-V8GT] (“Some frameworks, such as the . . . PSD2 . . . apply 
only to specific types of data, like payments processing data, and provide third parties with 
both ‘read’ and ‘write’ access to data and payment . . . . [T]he UK’s open banking initiative 
additionally requires the inclusion of publicly-available information on branch and ATM 
locations, bank products and fees. In contrast, Australia’s framework provides ‘read-only’ 
rights for data aggregation purposes and will eventually cover industries beyond banking.”). 
59 See Penny Crosman, Fintech Glasnost: Why U.S. Banks Are Opening Up APIs to 
Outsiders, AM. BANKER (July 8, 2015, 3:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ 
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companies trying to reach private agreements and understandings.60 For example, 
some banks and FinTech companies have partnered to form the Financial Data 
Exchange (“FDX”), a nonprofit that attempts to tackle the challenge of securely 
sharing consumers’ financial data.61 
This Article advocates for adopting consumer data regulation that would be 
inspired by the newly enacted Australian Consumer Data Right Bill (“CDR”),62 
arguing that market-led solutions are simply not enough to address consumer data 
sharing because of two main reasons: (i) consumers should have the legal right to 
manage their financial data, and the CFPB should be the one to address this issue 
while incorporating key concepts such as transparency, consumers’ informed 
consent to sharing data, competition laws, data security, financial institutions’ 
liability, and consumer protection into its potential regulation; and (ii) data 
aggregators, their activities, their impact on the market, and their transactions with 
key players in the financial industry, without scrutiny, are too significant to be left 
unregulated. 
First, consumers should have the legal right to manage their financial data. 
Therefore, a government agency must oversee and enforce the related rights and 
obligations connected with consumer data sharing. In the absence of a meta agency 
created for this purpose, many have identified the CFPB as the leading agency on 
consumer protection and FinTech-related issues and argued it should assume the role 
                                                   
fintech-glasnost-why-us-banks-are-opening-up-apis-to-outsiders [https://perma.cc/PW5V-
JV5T]. 
60 Similarly, the voluntary Model Agreement that the Clearing House (“TCH”) released 
on November 12, 2019, is meant to help banks and FinTech companies establish legal terms 
for the sharing of bank-held consumer data. See Value and Benefit of Model Data Access 
Agreement, THE CLEARING HOUSE (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/con 
nected-banking/-/media/3b6d0100f58148dd8416af58104faba6.ashx [https://perma.cc/XX 
T8-DP49] [hereinafter Model Data Access Agreement]. Specific banks and data aggregators 
have also been trying to work together. See, e.g, JPMorgan Chase, Envestnet|Yodlee Sign 
Agreement to Increase Customers’ Control of Their Data, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 5, 2019, 8:00 
AM) [hereinafter Increase Customers’ Control], https://www.businesswire.com/news/home 
/20191205005462/en/JPMorgan-Chase-Envestnet-Yodlee-Sign-Agreement-Increase 
[https://perma.cc/S8NG-HY83]. 
61 See Financial Industry Unites to Enhance Data Security, Innovation and Consumer 
Control, FIN. SERV.-INFO. SHARING ANALYSIS CENT. (Oct. 18, 2018) [hereinafter FS-ISAC], 
https://www.fsisac.com/article/financial-industry-unites-enhance-data-security-innovation-
and-consumer-control [https://perma.cc/SN4W-W6ER]. 
62  Australia’s Consumer Data Right (CDR) rules attempt to add personal data 
protection as an economy-wide right, to be applied sector-by-sector at the designation of the 
Australian Treasurer. See generally AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, 
CONSUMER DATA RIGHT RULES OUTLINE (2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/CD 
R-Rules-Outline-corrected-version-Jan-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JEG-YW6T] 
(explaining the CDR). 
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of the lead agency regulating and monitoring such issues.63 Moreover, the CFPB 
appears to be the natural candidate for this role, as it has the understanding, 
involvement, and experience in consumer financial data related matters. 
Specifically, in 2016, it even requested information about market practices related 
to access to consumers’ data, per Section 1033,64 and in 2017, it released non-
binding “Consumer Protection Principles” related to consumer-authorized use of 
financial data,65 expressing its vision for a safe, and workable data aggregation 
market.66 This Article argues that as part of the CPFB’s leadership on such issues, it 
should take on the regulation and supervision of data aggregators,67 and consumer 
financial data management.68 
This role could be tricky for the CFPB, which faced a series of challenges from 
all directions: “political and legal, empirical and anecdotal—about each and every 
part of its operations.”69 The CFPB’s opponents launched a campaign against it 
shortly after the 2016 presidential elections mainly because of its structure,70 which 
                                                   
63 This is especially needed as currently, different administrative government agencies 
have started to create regulatory models to govern their turfs of the data economy, but no 
agency has stepped up to become the go-to agency on FinTech matters. See, e.g., Van Loo, 
supra note 14, at 531–32 (exploring what the CFPB has done in its first several years to 
regulate FinTech). 
64 Barbara S. Mishkin, CFPB Issues Request for Information on Consumer Access to 
Financial Information, BALLARD SPAHR: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2016/11/18/cfpb-issues-request-for-information 
-on-consumer-access-to-financial-information [https://perma.cc/E8DS-XXTT].  
65 CFPB CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 1–5. 
66 Id. at 1. 
67 Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of 
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1606, 1609 (2019) [hereinafter Van Loo, The Missing 
Regulatory State] (arguing that regulatory monitoring of businesses is essential for protecting 
privacy and promoting consumer protection). “Congress has imposed similar minimum 
annual monitoring of oil and gas platforms, underground mines, large banks, credit rating 
agencies, and nuclear plants.” Id. 
68 It is therefore not surprising that in October 2020, the CPFB has decided to move 
forward with plans to issue a final rule in connection with consumers’ rights to access their 
financial data, and published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) addressing 
Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act. See Consumer Access to Financial Records, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 71,003 (proposed Nov. 6, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. X) [hereinafter the 
CPFB’s 2020 ANPR]; Kate Berry, CFPB Sets Stage for Long Fight on Data-Sharing Rule, 
AM. BANKER, (Nov. 13, 2020, 1:30PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-sets-
stage-for-long-fight-on-data-sharing-rule [https://perma.cc/5G78-W5KV].  
69 Hosea H. Harvey, Constitutionalizing Consumer Financial Protection: The Case for 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2429, 2430–31 (2019).  
70 The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of the CFPB reflects Congress’ careful thought 
to the structure of the Bureau, and the attempt to strengthen consumer financial protection in 
addition to shield federal oversight of consumer finance from short-term political interests. 
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Congress designed to protect its work and mission from narrow political interests.71 
This opposition campaign continued with a new CFPB Acting Director’s 
appointment, who halted implementation of certain rules and slowed enforcement 
efforts.72 Lastly, the campaign sought a Supreme Court’s holding on the CFPB’s 
structure and scope of work, “in a case that has become a flashpoint in a partisan 
battle over financial reform and the president’s constitutional powers.”73 In Seila 
Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,74 the Supreme Court focused 
on the CPFB’s single leader’s independent tenure protections meant to enable the 
CFPB to better protect consumers from financial institutions. The CFPB’s 
opponents argued that this structure does not align with the “notions of presidential 
control over the executive branch of the government.”75 Publishing its decision on 
June 29, 2020, the Court struck down the leadership structure as unconstitutional.76 
While the holding seems to jeopardize the CFPB’s operations, some commentators 
argue it “is a sheep that comes in wolf’s clothing.”77 Seven of the nine justices have 
left untouched all other aspects of the CFPB’s operations, with Chief Justice Roberts 
writing for the majority: “the CFPB’s structure and duties remain fully operative 
without the offending tenure restriction.” 78  This means that Seila represents a 
consumer victory because (i) no other constitutional challenges to the CFPB’s 
authority remain; (ii) the constitutional challenges, which impeded the CFPB’s 
enforcement work, have now been settled; and (iii) the immediate effect of Seila is 
to eliminate protections for the CFPB’s single leader, the President’s appointee that 
had been confirmed for five years, but can, post-Seila, be easily terminated. 
Therefore, Seila’s biggest effect will likely be a new director appointment with every 
newly elected President. Hopefully, such personnel changes will not immobilize the 
CFPB’s operations, and it will continue to protect consumers, their interests, and 
their financial data rights. 
Second, market-led solutions are not enough to address consumer financial data 
issues because data aggregators are too significant to be left unregulated.79 These 
                                                   
71  Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543, 2545 (2019).  
72  See Leonard Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the 21st Century, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1141, 1146–49 (2012) (describing the powers Congress bestowed upon the CFPB). 
73 John Kruzel & Harper Neidig, The 7 Most Anticipated Supreme Court Decisions, 
THE HILL (June 7, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/501437-the-
7-most-anticipated-supreme-court-decisions [https://perma.cc/5M36-5SCR]. 
74 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
75 See Richard Cordray, Opinion, Why the CFPB’s Loss at the Supreme Court Is Really 




78 140 S. Ct. at 2209. 
79 See Steven Harras, Regulators Need to Help Banks Manage Fintech Risks, FDIC IG 
Says in Report, CONG. Q. ROLL CALL, FEB. 27, 2019, 2019 WL 948553. 
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include the problem of consumers’ fictional consent, liability issues, security risks, 
and even systemic risk, in addition to stifling innovation and anti-trust concerns. 
Moreover, much like credit rating agencies prior to the 2008 financial crisis80—
too important and influential of gatekeepers to be left untouched—more than a 
decade later, it is clear data aggregators, which collect, maintain, and share consumer 
financial data, have become too important to be left alone, and must be regulated by 
the relevant government agencies.81 
 
II.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL DATA 
 
A.  It’s All About the Data 
 
The concept of open banking aims to level the financial industry’s playing field 
by offering a competitive advantage to FinTech companies, which otherwise might 
never compete with big banks.82 In some parts of the world, like the EU, open 
banking initiatives are legally binding, and large banks must comply. In others, open 
banking initiatives result from market demands, and in particular, consumer demand 
for better, faster, and more user-friendly products and services, which are served by 
FinTech companies’ offerings.83  Either way, the trend pressures big banks into 
sharing their customers’ information, and American banks have found themselves 
                                                   
80 After the 2008 financial crisis, it became clear that there was a need for greater 
government regulation of rating agencies, especially given the conflicts of interest in their 
business model, which did not comply with appropriate due diligence standards. See, e.g., 
Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in 
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 60–61 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & 
Robert E. Litan eds., 2006); Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating 
Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 342–43 (2006). 
81  Indeed, according to a 2019 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Report: 
“[w]ithin each jurisdiction, multiple authorities can have a role in addressing issues related 
to banks’ sharing of customer-permissioned data with third parties owing to the multi-
disciplinary aspects of open banking. Relevant authorities may include, for example, bank 
supervisors, competition authorities, and consumer protection authorities . . . . Given the 
variety of authorities involved and various mandates of these authorities, greater 
coordination may be needed.” See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 58, 
at 5. 
82 Penny Crosman, How APIs Are Being Used at Citi, BBVA and Other Leading Banks, 
AM. BANKER (May 27, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-apis-
are-being-used-at-citi-bbva-and-other-leading-banks [https://perma.cc/CPN3-2YBD].  
83 See, e.g., Cheng-Yun Tsang, From Industry Sandbox to Supervisory Control Box: 
Rethinking the Role of Regulators in the Era of FinTech, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
355, 358 (2019) (“In recent years, many jurisdictions are implementing the so-called ‘open 
banking’ policies to enable efficient customer data sharing between banks and payment 
service providers.”). 
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needing to set up contracts with data aggregators such as Intuit, Plaid, Finicity, and 
Yodlee, that in turn share data with FinTech companies using APIs.84 
Open banking, using APIs, began as an alternative85 to the globally disliked 
practice of screen-scraping,86 also known as “web scraping,”87 in which a software 
automatically “contact[s] various Web sites and extract[s] relevant information.”88 
In the context of banking, the term refers to a non-bank that offers products and 
services, and obtains bank customers’ secure credentials.89 The non-bank then uses 
                                                   
84 Id. (detailing how banks and data aggregators use APIs); see also Alex Konrad, 
Fintech Startup Plaid Is Now Valued at $2.65 Billion After $250 Million Raise, FORBES (Dec. 
11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2018/12/11/mary-meekers-first-post-
kleiner-deal-fintech-startup-plaid-now-valued-at-265-billion/#3fc53c2977d6 [https://perma. 
cc/7CMU-UYC6]. Konrad explains:  
 
If you’re a consumer who has signed up for apps like Acorns or Robinhood, 
there’s a good chance you used Plaid without knowing it. At its most basic, Plaid 
helps developers embed a snippet of code within their apps that prompts you to 
input your banking info and then securely confirm it with the bank itself.  
Id. 
85  See Model Data Access Agreement, supra note 60, at 1. The Clearing House 
advocated for a transition to APIs in order to enhance “safety and security of customer 
account data, [and] facilitate a consumer consent model focused on clarity and transparency 
of the data sharing process and enable future fintech innovation.” Id. 
86 Scrapers have even been referred to, in one extreme case, as “a low lying snake belly 
scum sucking rat” who should be “quartered and hung . . . .” Tamburo v. Dworkin, 974 F. 
Supp. 2d 1199, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
87 Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 381 (2018) (“Courts have struggled to settle on a 
common terminology for web scraping, let alone what types of activity should meet the 
definition.”). 
88 Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (the 
first decision to define a web scraper). A more detailed definition comes from the First 
Circuit in the 2003 scraping case EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 60 (1st 
Cir. 2003):  
 
A scraper, also called a “robot” or “bot,” is nothing more than a computer program 
that accesses information contained in a succession of webpages stored on the 
accessed computer. Strictly speaking, the accessed information is not the 
graphical interface seen by the user but rather the HTML source code — available 
to anyone who views the site—that generates the graphical interface. This 
information is then downloaded to the user’s computer.  
 
Id. 
89 Lael Brainard, Governor, Fed. Rsrv. Bd., at the Northwestern Kellogg Public-Private 
Interface Conference on New Developments in Consumer Finance: Research & Practice: 
Where Do Banks Fit in the Fintech Stack? 10 (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170428a.htm [https://perma. 
cc/V6HZ-NTMZ]. Brainard explains:  
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the credentials to access the customers’ bank accounts and takes their financial data, 
which it saves in an app. 
 
B.  Keeping Up with Customer Expectations: Faster & Cheaper 
 
Studies have shown that customer satisfaction is the key to corporate success.90 
Consumers’ expectations and demands from their service providers are constantly 
changing as the bar keeps rising in our fast-paced technology-dependent era. Like 
other types of services, consumers want and expect speed in financial services.91 For 
example, if a digital banking app cannot do something consumers want when it is 
needed, or if, even one time, customers cannot easily access or login to the app, they 
might abandon the app. 92  Likewise, lowering costs is also important. When 
surveyed, consumers indicated they wanted the innovation of FinTech when dealing 
with financial service providers, but they also wanted the data security and privacy 
offered by traditional banks.93 In particular, consumers wanted to share, manage, 
and control their financial data, but two-thirds of the surveyed users expressed 
concerns about data privacy and sharing.94 Therefore, a critical question is how can 
                                                   
 
Data aggregators can still move forward to collect consumer data for use by 
fintech developers without the permission or even potentially without the 
knowledge of the bank. Instead . . . developers directly ask consumers to give 
them their online banking logins and passwords. Then, in a process commonly 
called “screen scraping,” data aggregators log onto banks’ online consumer 
websites, as if they were the actual consumers, and extract information.  
 
Id. 
90 See Andre Schwager & Chris Meyer, Understanding Customer Experience, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Feb. 2007), https://hbr.org/2007/02/understanding-customer-experience 
[https://perma.cc/KQ4H-2TPJ]. 
91 Mark Smedley, Why the Future of Banking Is ‘Open,’ WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://partners.wsj.com/oracle/future-banking-open/ [https://perma.cc/G88N-BQ52] 
(“Customers now expect their financial providers to offer more than just transactional 
services. Rather, they want innovations that help them manage their financial matters 
conveniently and securely from any device.”). 
92  See Ruby Hinchliffe, Nationwide Exec: Banks Can’t Do Everything, FINTECH 
FUTURES (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.fintechfutures.com/2019/10/nationwide-exec-banks-
cant-do-everything [https://perma.cc/34Q5-FT9E]. 
93 Press Release, The Clearing House, The Clearing House Supports Financial Data 
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we safely reach open banking goals while keeping in mind the key pillars of financial 
regulation—prudential regulation and consumer protection?95 
Technology companies are subject to far less regulation than traditional 
financial institutions, and that advantage enables FinTech companies to offer 
consumers faster and cheaper services and products. 96  In return, consumers’ 
demands for these services and products have increasingly pushed more technology 
companies to operate in the financial service landscape. As a recent TechCrunch 
article title stated, “[e]very startup is a bank—or wants to be.”97 Illustrating this 
sentiment, the CEO of Citibank in an annual bankers’ conference in 2019 recalled 
“meeting a young Silicon Valley entrepreneur several years ago” that looked at him 
“and pretty much said, ‘We’ve come to eat your lunch, old man.’”98 
 
C.  Data Aggregators 
 
Joining the FinTech revolution, “data aggregators”—entities that “access, 
aggregate, share, and store consumer financial account and transaction data they 
acquire through connections to financial services companies,”99—have become key 
financial industry players. These companies 
 
are intermediaries between the fintech applications that consumers use to 
access their data, on the one hand, and the sources of data at financial 
services companies on the other. An aggregator may be a generic provider 
of data to consumer fintech application providers and other third parties, 
or it may be part of a company providing branded and direct services to 
consumers.100 
 
                                                   
95 See, e.g., Ruth Plato-Shinar, Financial Consumer Protection in the Post Financial 
Crisis Era: Can the American CFPB Serve as a Model for Other Jurisdictions?, 54 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 171, 172 (2019). 
96 See Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, 
Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 499, 505 (2019) (discussing the gaps in the supervision of FinTech companies and how 
that encourages them to engage in regulatory arbitrage). 
97 Alex Wilhelm & Kate Clark, Every Startup Is a Bank—or Wants to Be, TECHCRUNCH 
(Nov. 8, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/08/every-startup-is-a-bank-or-
wants-to-be/ [https://perma.cc/89BJ-DUF5]; accord Alex Wilhelm & Natasha Mascarenhas, 
Why Is Every Startup a Bank These Days?, CRUNCHBASE (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/why-is-every-startup-a-bank-these-days/ [https://perma 
.cc/BC86-HNMF]. 
98 Brendan Pedersen, Citi’s Corbat Warns Banks: Don’t Become ‘the Dumb Utility,’ 
AM. BANKER (Nov. 20, 2019, 6:21 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/citigroups-
corbat-warns-banks-dont-become-the-dumb-utility [https://perma.cc/6K6L-UE43]. 
99 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 23–24. 
100 Id. 
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In the U.S., there are several major data aggregators 101  and the scope and 
sophistication of their services ranges.102 Some data aggregators mainly aggregate 
financial account balances, transactions data, or credit card activity. Others support 
FinTech app providers that offer certain types of products, such as student loans or 
services like fees payment monitoring.103 
Data aggregators make data available by providing a platform through which 
FinTech companies interface with consumers. They make it easier for FinTech 
companies to operate. There are only a few major data aggregators versus thousands 
of financial institutions, and data aggregators have usually sunk the costs of 
connecting to financial institutions, so FinTech companies can focus solely on 
designing products or services to the aggregators’ specifications rather than 
thousands of banks.104 
But, prior to starting interfaces with FinTech companies, data aggregators gain 
access to consumers’ information directly from the bank. The aggregators then 
attempt to put the consumers’ financial information under one roof—the consumer’s 
“dashboard”105—which exhibits one’s “investments, savings, insurance policies, 
and credit balances.”106  Additionally, a dashboard can include services like tax 
planning, budgeting, data on home value or mortgage, and more inclusive, costly 
services, like portfolio analysis, financial advice, auto bill-payments, and credit 
monitoring.107 
Data aggregators can also track data from non-financial entities and add data 
from external financial accounts to existing financial providers like a bank. Either 
way, data aggregation happens and is typically done via screen-scraping or APIs.108 
  
                                                   
101 See MX Technologies Inc., supra note 34. 
102 See generally Michael Kitces, The Six Levels of Account Aggregation #FinTech and 
PFM Portals for Financial Advisors, KITCES (Oct. 9, 2017, 7:01 AM), 
https://www.kitces.com/blog/six-levels-account-aggregation-pfm-fintech-solutions-account 




105 Potential Benefits and Risks of the Increased Use of Data in Financial Services 
Applications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 115th Cong. 2 
(2018) (statement of Brian Knight, Dir., Innovation & Governance Program, Mercatus Ctr. 
at George Mason Univ.), https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Knight%20Test 
imony%209-18-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8Q6-TGFZ] (“Third-party aggregators, acting on 
a consumer’s behalf, can now allow consumers to see all of their accounts from different 
financial services providers at a glance. This convenient display of information can help 
consumers more effectively assess and manage their finances.”). 
106 Know Before You Share, supra note 32. 
107 Id. 
108 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 25–26. 
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1.  Screen-scraping 
 
If data aggregators and FinTech app providers do not have a direct connection 
to operate FinTech apps using data stored at financial services companies, they 
usually screen-scrape. When screen-scraping, consumers provide their full account 
login credentials—usernames and passwords—to use FinTech apps.109 In particular, 
consumers’ secure login credentials enable data aggregators to “scrape” data on a 
daily basis. Scraping is done manually or through automated processes, which 
entails a code that reaches out to third-party websites, connects using the consumers’ 
security credentials, gets the relevant account information, and if needed, executes 
transactions.110 While this process makes screen-scraping an effective method of 
obtaining data, it also creates significant vulnerabilities and security-related 
drawbacks. For example, one significant drawback is that banks are often not aware 
when their customers’ data is being screen-scraped.111 
Additionally, consumers do not understand the consequences of giving their 
credentials to a third-party rather than logging in directly to their own financial 
services company. 112  There is a growing disconnect between consumers’ 
perceptions of and knowledge about financial data collection practices. Specifically, 
70% of surveyed consumers who use financial apps were confident their banking 
information was private and secure, but (i) 80% were not fully aware that the apps 
they use, or the third-parties associated with their apps, may store their bank account 
username and password; and (ii) only 21% were aware that financial apps have 
access to their data until they revoke permissions.113 Similarly, normalizing the 
practice of sharing banking login credentials exposes consumers to various risks. 
First, fraudsters pretending to be data aggregators can potentially trick and deceive 
consumers. Second, hackers can attempt to break into data aggregators’ systems and 
steal consumers’ login credentials. Third, rogue employees working for data 
aggregators can easily abuse access to the accounts and financial data.114 Lastly, if 
allowing screen-scraping as a commonly used method continues, regulators will be 
unable to require banks to stiffen up authentication by requiring certain types of 
multifactor authentication, such as biometrics.115  
                                                   
109  Screen-scraping is not a recent development. As far back as 2001, regulators 
identified the practice of sharing consumer login credentials for data aggregation services as 
raising additional risks. See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. 
2001-12, BANK-PROVIDED ACCOUNT AGGREGATION SERVICES: GUIDANCE TO BANKS 
(2001), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2001/bulletin-2001-12.html 
[https://perma.cc/PUL6-F9YU]; FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, E-BANKING, IT 
EXAMINATION HANDBOOK D-1 (2003), https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/274777/ffiec_it 
booklet_e-banking.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM2V-N9G4]. 
110 Know Before You Share, supra note 32. 
111 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 25–26. 
112 See CONSUMER SURVEY, supra note 37, at 5. 
113 Id. at 3–6. 
114 See Crosman, Data-Sharing Debate, supra note 35. 
115 Id. 
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Figure 1. 
 
The above image shows how information sharing works when conducted using Plaid as a 
middleman.116 
 
2.  APIs 
 
Using APIs is another way to access consumer financial data because APIs 
grant direct feed.117 APIs are codes that connect two or more systems, and enables 
clearly-stated communications and information exchange between the connected 
systems to operate apps and various types of software.118 Essentially, APIs are a 
technology-enabled agreement—almost a contract of sort—that empowers 
computer systems or data sources to work with or be used by a different software. 
Unlike screen-scraping, data aggregations that rely upon APIs typically entail parties 
to a certain agreement because the entities chose to partake in data sharing.119 Hence, 
financial services providers can potentially use APIs to enable the inclusion of 
vigorous security features, as well as “greater transparency and access controls for 
consumers,” stronger focus on data accuracy, and more reliable and affordable data 
technology costs.120 
                                                   
116 Gordon Wintrob, How Plaid’s API Brings Finance into the 21st Century, GET PUT 
POST (Mar. 15, 2016), https://getputpost.co/how-plaid-s-api-brings-finance-into-the-21st-
century-efc174028f09 [https://perma.cc/2AHM-3XA3]. 
117 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 26, n.47.  
118 Id. (“To illustrate how this works, think for example of nearly any app or website—
for example, for ride-sharing services, retail stores, special events, etc.—that includes a map 
or the ability to provide point-to-point (or turn by-turn) directions. These apps and websites 
generally do not create their own maps and navigation software. Instead, they would 
incorporate the maps and navigation software of an internet-based provider that specializes 
in aggregating mapping and navigation data. This provider makes its mapping and navigation 
products available for use by third-parties by establishing an API that includes instructions, 
tools, and other resources that enable software developers to incorporate such products into 
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While APIs are becoming more common,121 their development can be pricey, 
which means smaller banks with fewer resources might not utilize them.122 APIs can 
be created to be open or restricted to specifically designated partners.123 This design 
choice gives banks executing APIs too much power: in an Open API system, any 
third-party data aggregator or FinTech app provider that meets specific standards 
agreed upon in advance can access consumer financial data and build consumer-
facing apps. Differently, a restricted API system, which is often referred to as a 
Partnered API system, is based on limited, two-sided agreements between banks and 
data aggregators or FinTech app providers.124 
  
                                                   
121 Cf. Ron Shevlin, Open Banking Won’t Work in the U.S., FORBES (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronshevlin/2019/04/15/open-banking-wont-work-in-us/#718b 
1f3f1e52 [https://perma.cc/E43F-37SV] (“Achieving scale requires a platform (like an 
Amazon or Goldman) who can integrate many providers . . . . Being able to create a 
technology platform to do this has been beyond the reach of most banks and credit unions.”). 
122 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 58, at 6. The Committee 
determined: 
 
[S]ome challenges associated with the universal use of APIs remain. The time and 
cost to build and maintain APIs (particularly when done on a bilateral basis with 
multiple organisations), the lack of commonly accepted API standards in some 
jurisdictions, and the economic cost for smaller banks to develop and adopt APIs 
have been cited as challenges. 
 
Id. 
123 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 26. 
124 Id. at 27. 
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Figure 2. 
The above graph shows how information sharing works when conducted using a Partnered API system 
vs. an Open API system.125  
 
Consumers must give consent to either the banks or the API access point in 
open and restricted API systems. In contrast, under the screen-scraping data sharing 
method, consumers must share their login credentials. 
 
3.  Improving Data Aggregation 
 
In recent years there seems to be a growing understanding that consumers 
should have dependable and secure access to their data and that they should utilize 
FinTech apps, if desired.126 But “there is a lack of consensus on what secure and 
reliable access” to consumers’ financial data should entail.127 Therefore, “the U.S. 
debate seems stuck at the yet-to-be resolved issue of migrating account aggregators 
from screen-scraping-based to more secure and efficient API-based data-sharing 
methodologies.”128 Meanwhile, consumers are stuck in the middle of the debate, 
suffering from consequences ranging from banks choking off data to exposing 
consumers to privacy and security risks, of which they might not be aware.129 
                                                   
125 Id. at 26–27. 
126 Id. at 27. 
127 Id. 
128 Bob Hedges, Banking Perspectives: Consumer Data in an API-Enabled World, THE 
CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2017/2017-q4-
banking-perspectives/articles/open-banking [https://perma.cc/9B2T-8QWX] (last visited 
July 7, 2020). 
129 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 27. 
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Acknowledging some of these dangers, FINRA published a strongly worded 
warning in 2018 addressing the risks associated with sharing account data with data 
aggregators. 130  The risks “include potential vulnerability to cyber fraud, 
unauthorized transactions, and identity theft. A key risk is that the aggregators could 
be storing all consumer financial information or security credentials in one place, 
creating a new and heightened security risk for consumers.”131 FINRA’s warning is 
important. Data aggregators are trusted with access to investors’ financial accounts 
but are not regulated like financial institutions.132 They collect, store, and maintain 
data as they see fit while relying on cloud services such as Amazon Web Services.133 
Data aggregators are hardly the only ones relying on cloud services. All major 
industries and government agencies do the same, but this reliance has largely been 
ignored in the context of cybersecurity risks.134 Yet, such risks become very relevant 
when dealing with massive amounts of aggregated personal information. Moreover, 
not being regulated like banks means that if data aggregators are compromised in a 
breach, or if FinTech apps have exploitable vulnerabilities, then the login credentials 
of accounts, including traditional bank accounts, could be jeopardized. 
                                                   
130 See Crosman, Finra’s Dire Warning, supra note 36. 
131 Know Before You Share, supra note 32. 
132 See Crosman, Finra’s Dire Warning, supra note 36. However, commenting on the 
issue of regulation, some believe that if the data is “encrypted, tokenized and split across 
multiple regions in Amazon Web Services . . . [t]here’s no way to pull a single transaction . . . 
or . . . routing number and connect it to an individual.” Id. (quotations omitted). Similarly, a 
spokeswoman for one of the biggest data aggregators, Envestnet|Yodlee, said Yodlee:  
 
Adheres to, and in many cases exceeds, the security and risk management 
standards required to engage with consumers and their financial data. Yodlee is 
supervised and examined by the [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] and 
all major regulators, including nearly 200 individual audits by financial 
institutions over a recent 24-month period.  
 
Id. (quotations omitted). Similarly, the CEO of Finicity stated that he “does not see a need 
for data aggregators to go through the same regulatory scrutiny as banks . . . . I’m not holding 
assets, I’m a service provider. I’m not a bank . . . . It’s a little cavalier to say aggregators 
need to be held to the same regulatory standard.” Id. (quotations omitted). 
133 Id. (describing how a data aggregator executive argued that data is clearly safer with 
the aggregator since it is a professional organization that logs in through secure methods than 
with individuals who “[log] in from an unsecure Wi-Fi network in a coffee shop”).  
134  See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-to-Fail 2.0? Digital Service 
Providers as Cyber-Social Systems, 93 IND. L.J. 1211 (2018) (elaborating on the need for 
greater security in critical digital services). Any potential harm can be massive in terms of 
privacy and financial loss. “For example, according to estimates, a recent four-hour outage 
of Amazon’s S3 cloud storage system that was not the result of a cyberattack, cost S&P 500 
companies at least $150 million. Accordingly, losses resulting from a large-scale attack on a 
cloud service are estimated in the billions.” Id. at 1236.  
 
2020] SHOW ME THE (DATA ABOUT THE) MONEY! 1303 
If customers’ credentials are jeopardized, they would be exposed to data and 
financial losses with very limited, if any, legal recourse.135 Similarly, focusing on 
the issue of credential sharing, banks have maintained that if consumers share their 
credentials with third-parties and fraud takes place, liability protections like 
Regulation E—establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants 
in electronic fund transfer systems136—will not be available for consumers.137 The 
issue, however, is broader than just credential sharing. Any time information is 
shared with a third-party, that information can be compromised with the level of risk 
depending on the type of information being shared and the method used to share the 
information.138 
However, industry participants believe that the most dangerous type of data 
sharing is done via screen-scraping because after consumers share login information, 
data aggregators extract transaction information to populate their services and store 
and maintain the credentials, sometimes even after the relationship with the 
consumer ends.139 But what is worse is that consumers frequently forget sharing 
their login information and delete the apps for which they shared their data. Yet, data 
aggregators continue to pull data from the often unsuspecting banking sites.140 
Furthermore, even when banks suspect such activities, screen-scraping interferes 
                                                   
135 See Crosman, Finra’s Dire Warning, supra note 36. 
136 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–205.20  (2020). Regulation E implements the Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act, which creates a framework that defines rights, liabilities, and obligations of 
participants in the electronic fund and remittance transfer systems. Id.  
137 Moreover, the banks “face ambiguity and uncertainty as to the applicability of 
certain privacy rules, the Bank Secrecy Act provisions and regulations, and Anti-Money 
Laundering standards.” COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GEN. ON FIN. OVERSIGHT, TOP 
MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FACING FINANCIAL-SECTOR REGULATORY 
ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/CIGFO-TMPC-Report-July-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5CR-T5LV]. 
138 See Crosman, Finra’s Dire Warning, supra note 36. 
139 See Natalie S. Talpas, Senior Vice President and Digit. Prod. Mgmt. Grp. Manager, 
PNC Bank, Statement at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on 
Consumer Access to Financial Records, Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act 5 (Feb. 26, 
2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_talpas-statement_symposium-
consumer-access-financial-records.pdf [https://perma.cc/48DV-JLXV]. Talpas concludes: 
 
Most consumers also do not realize that the aggregator may continue to obtain 
this information even if the consumer stops using or deletes the financial app. 
Rather, to cease the aggregator’s collection of information, the consumer must 
affirmatively revoke the authorization provided to the aggregator. However, the 
means of doing so often are not clear or easy.  
 
Id. 
140 Id.  
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with their ability to create vigorous risk-based profiles of the banks’ users since data 
aggregators can login from different locations at different times through codes.141 
In May 2020, a group of consumers focused on some of these challenging data 
sharing issues and filed a class action against Plaid.142 The complaint raised causes 
of action based on: invasion of privacy; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; the 
Stored Communications Act; unjust enrichment; California Business and 
Professions Code Section 17200; Article I, Section I of the California Constitution; 
the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005; California Civil Code Sections 1709 and 1710; and 
California’s Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act.143 
According to the complaint, “Plaid’s software is used by more than 2,000 apps 
to link consumer financial accounts, and about 1 in 4 people in the U.S. have an 
account linked via Plaid . . . .”144 The complaint alleged that “Plaid uses that access 
to deceptively obtain bank account information from users, accessing information 
back up to five years, averaging 3,700 transactions per consumer . . . .”145 In addition, 
Plaid “allegedly gathers information on accounts maintained for others such as 
relatives and children, and has amassed data from over 200 million distinct financial 
accounts.”146 Allegedly, 
 
[W]hen a user enters their bank login information on an app that uses 
Plaid, the credentials, including security layers such as security questions 
and answers and one-time passwords, are transmitted directly to Plaid, 
rather than to the bank. Plaid then uses that information to access the 
consumer’s bank account multiple times a day, gathering private 
information and then selling it . . . .147  
                                                   
141 Id. at 6–8. Responding to this argument, data aggregators have claimed that they can  
 
[G]ive banks all the IP addresses they’ll communicate from ahead of time, so the 
bank can identify them as they come in[] . . . [and disagreed with the notion] that 
banks’ servers can’t handle the traffic from data aggregators. [Bill Harris, CEO of 
the financial planning app provider Personal Capital, said,] [i]n 2017, we have 
massively scalable computers[.] . . . Google handles 40,000 data requests per 
second. There is so much available from relatively small machines at a relatively 
low price. For anybody who knows how to spell IT, handling these kinds of 
volumes is nothing. 
 
Crosman, Data-Sharing Debate, supra note 35. 
142 Complaint at 1–2, Cottle v. Plaid Inc., No. 4:20-cv-03056-DMR (N.D. Cal. May 4, 
2020). 
143 Id.; Maeve Allsup, App Users Say Plaid Collects Bank Logins Without Consent (1), 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 5, 2020, 5:16 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/app-
users-say-plaid-collects-bank-logins-without-consent [https://perma.cc/QA4C-4YLE]. 
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The complaint further claims that if Plaid “would be acquired by Visa in a $5.3 
billion deal that would give Visa access to Plaid’s data,” that such a deal would be 
yet “another example of Plaid selling consumer data without consent . . . .”148 
According to the allegations, all consumers see is a login screen with their banks’ 
logos, but that screen is operated by Plaid, which misrepresents the situation for 
users, who are not presented with adequate privacy policies or terms of use.149 
Accordingly, data aggregators, FinTech app providers, and U.S. banks are 
searching for better approaches to data aggregation. The use of APIs instead of 
screen-scraping has obvious advantages,150 thereby leading to the development of a 
middle-ground solution, in which data aggregators implement APIs that banks 
currently use and leverage to populate their sites.151 
But using the API method for handling data has certain limitations that can 
result in parties resorting to screen-scraping.152 First, while some data aggregators 
have entered into mutual agreements to access data using an API, this approach can 
prove challenging to scale considering just how many financial institutions operate 
                                                   
148 Id. Note, however, that based on its recently filed complaint against Visa, the DOJ 
believes that the main reason to stop Visa’s acquisition of Plaid relates to antitrust issues. 
Complaint, USA v. Visa Inc., 4:20-cv-07810 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020). Particularly, 
according to the recently filed DOJ lawsuit, Visa is a rich and powerful monopolist that has 
led the online debit market field for years, holding approximately 70% of the market. Id. at 
8. Barriers to entry combined with “Visa’s long-term, restrictive contracts with banks, are 
nearly insurmountable, meaning Visa rarely faces any significant threats to its online debit 
monopoly.” Id. at 3. The DOJ lawsuit claims that when Visa realized how Plaid—a provider 
of services that enable consumers and merchants to transact, as it supports and connects 
thousands of FinTech apps, with more than 11,000 domestic financial institutions, and over 
200 million consumer bank accounts—could meaningfully compete with Visa, it decided to 
take action and buy Plaid. Id. at 3–4. The DOJ further argues that the acquisition would result 
in higher prices for online debit transactions, less innovation, and would raise competitors’ 
barriers to entry. Id. at 2–3. 
149 Allsup, supra note 143 (“A login screen with your bank’s branding is actually 
controlled by and connected to Plaid, the suit says, which uses bank logos to provide a false 
sense of comfort for users. Additionally, the privacy policy is not meaningfully presented to 
users, the suit claims.”). 
150 See Increase Customers’ Control, supra note 61. Envestnet|Yodlee, one of the 
biggest data aggregators, explained that their  
 
partnership with Chase will allow further consumer choice, reliability, and insight 
into how and where their data is being used, along with improved overall financial 
well-being . . . . [T]he secure API uses a token-based approach, [and] customers 
will no longer need to give out their username and password—confidential 




152 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 27–28. 
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in the U.S. 153  Second, access to data via APIs is usually one-sidedly limited, 
controlled, interrupted, or terminated by financial institutions.154 APIs are simply 
gateways that allow developers to integrate transaction and account data from banks 
into third-party apps and restrict how much and how often apps can tap information 
while also contractually limiting what they can do with it later.155 As such, data 
aggregators and FinTech companies claim that financial institutions largely refuse 
to enable direct access to their data or to set up truly open APIs.156 They argue that 
without some sort of regulatory guidance, API access would be limited to specific 
types of information dictated by financial institutions, as opposed to consumers, and 
could be subject to unreasonable and disproportionate liability.157 Lastly, APIs can 
serve as a gateway to the data center by which attackers can efficiently attack the 
backend via bots and compromised or impersonating applications.158 Application 
                                                   
153 Id. at 27. 
154 See Sidel, supra note 23.  
155 API contracts outline the “terms and conditions” of the service, mandate how the 
relevant APIs can be used by third-party developers, and include details about their structure, 
guarantees and limitations. See Markos Zachariadis & Pinar Ozcan, The API Economy and 
Digital Transformation in Financial Services: The Case of Open Banking 8 (SWIFT Inst. 
Working Paper No. 2016-001, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2975199 [https://perma.cc/SN7C-QSH2]. 
156 See, e.g., DANIEL CASTRO & MICHAEL STEINBERG, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION, 
BLOCKED: WHY SOME COMPANIES RESTRICT DATA ACCESS TO REDUCE COMPETITION AND 
HOW OPEN APIS CAN HELP 2 (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www2.datainnovation.org/2017-open-
apis.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C2R-9MD7]. 
157 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 34.  
158 Rusty Carter, APIs: The Trojan Horses of Security, HELP NET SECURITY (Sept. 10, 
2018), https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/09/10/api-insecurity/ [https://perma.cc/UW 
7G-FZX9]. Carter claims 
 
published apps can provide a roadmap for an attacker to target APIs and, as a 
result, a backend data centre . . . . Cybercriminals have realised that API calls that 
originate from inside an app are a blueprint for the infrastructure inside a data 
centre. What’s worse, they can use those same API calls to hide their malicious 
purposes – like a Trojan horse gaining access through the front door. . . . 
[S]ophisticated attackers will focus their efforts on targeting a single application. 
By compromising web or mobile apps they can emulate the behaviour of an 
unmodified application to establish a baseline of legitimate access to the backend. 
This pattern of behaviour can then be widened to slowly exfiltrate data over time 
and find subtle violations of the data access control, often using methods that the 
“normal” application already uses — rendering noisy, detectable exploits 
unnecessary. These seemingly innocuous requests essentially become the 
attacker’s most effective tool . . . . Less sophisticated attackers try to compromise 
app APIs by simply injecting malicious content into API request fields. This is a 
relatively low-effort method to uncover vulnerabilities when the requests are 
processed . . . . More savvy attackers, however, are able to target a single app by 
taking a more sophisticated approach, which is designed to circumvent both WAF 
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endpoints are highly vulnerable and “are becoming more attractive to attackers due 
to [banks] using [them] to make things easier and more convenient for their 
customers.”159 
Attempting to solve these limitations, different players from across the data 
aggregation ecosystem collaborate to create open APIs that serve the needs of all 
industry participants.160 For example, in May 2020, Plaid, which originally catered 
to FinTech companies’ needs, changed course following Visa’s announcement of 
Plaid’s purchase and the Coronavirus crisis that made many of its FinTech customers 
unsuccessful or try to pivot, and launched Plaid Exchange prioritizing banks’ 
interests.161 Plaid Exchange, in which banks call the shots regarding data-sharing 
efforts, is 
                                                   
and RASP security methods. They can establish a baseline of legitimate backend 




160 An example includes the Open Financial Exchange (“OFX”) Consortium, which 
started in 1997. See Press Release, OFX Consortium, OFX 2.2 Released with OAuth-Token 
Based Authentication (Apr. 7, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home 
/20160407006078/en/OFX-2.2-Released-OAuth-Token-based-Authentication [https://perm 
a.cc/6K8P-6JB3]. The OFX specification is a unique standard for the exchange of financial 
data between financial institutions and consumers. Id. In April 2016, the OFX Consortium 
released OFX 2.2, containing new standards such as data tags and tokenized authentication 
solutions for exchanges of data. Id. In 2017, JPMorgan Chase also came to an agreement 
with Intuit, using a read-only API that was based on the OFX 2.2 standard and tokenizing 
authentication using OAuth 2.0, which banks such as Wells Fargo use as well. See Crosman, 
Data-Sharing Debate, supra note 35. In the banks’ opinion, 
 
“The most important part of this is giving control to the customer,” JPMorgan’s 
Dimon said in a press release announcing the Intuit partnership. The use of the 
OAuth standard means each third party will have a different “token” that allows 
them to read data from a user’s account. Users can set those tokens to expire or 
delete, or modify them through the bank website.  
 
Id. Similarly, the Aggregation Services Working Group of the Financial Services 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (“FS-ISAC”), which includes representatives from 
all relevant stakeholders of the financial industry, launched a new version of its API for 
secure, tokenized data transfer. See Warwick Ashford, FS-ISAC Enables Safer Financial 
Data Sharing with API, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252434931/FS-ISAC-enables-safer-financial-data-
sharing-with-API [https://perma.cc/Z2AE-8GRA]. 
161  Ron Shevlin, Plaid Launches API Exchange to Accelerate Open Banking and 
Digital Transformation, FORBES (May 19, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ronshevlin/2020/05/19/visas-plaid-launches-api-exchange-to-accelerate-open-banking-and-
digital-transformation/#7f02ff7c2b37 [https://perma.cc/U9NX-9N5M] [hereinafter Shevlin, 
Plaid Launches API Exchange] (“Plaid’s core customer base—fintechs—are hurting because 
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a bank product that will enable banks to expose APIs to a range of trusted 
fintech developers. Banks that utilize Plaid Exchange will also gain 
visibility into which 3rd parties have access to customer accounts and be 
able to communicate that to the customer and turn connectivity on and 
off.162 
 
This enables Plaid, as the data aggregator and the middleman, to identify and control 
access from FinTech companies. The biggest American banks, like JPMorgan Chase 
or Wells Fargo, have already created direct access paths for major data aggregators 
or created their own APIs.163 In contrast, small banks have not followed the big 
banks because they typically lack the resources needed to develop their own APIs.164 
According to Plaid, “[t]he real shift here is this is standardized, almost open-finance-
in-a-box. It’s built around an API core and we can implement it at scale with any 
bank that wants it.” 165  Standardizing is important. Open banking is based on 
common standards and definitions that make data sharing usable, and that can 
happen if Plaid Exchange serves as a platform, as displayed in the image below. 
  
                                                   
of the COVID-19 crisis. Fintech lenders have been hit hard with loan defaults, while 
challenger banks are suffering from reduced payments volume.”). 
162 See Sloane, supra note 43. Sloane notes 
 
Banks that choose to work with Plaid to build their API would then have a modern 
token-based system for their customers. For instance, just like on a social network, 
customers would be able to see if they have connected their bank account with a 
third-party service and disable those connections. Financial institutions could also 
leverage Plaid Exchange to build new services that connect directly with your 
main bank account through the API. Companies would be able to see if 
connections are working fine, which would make it much easier to identify issues 
with the infrastructure.  
 
Id. 
163 See Penny Crosman, Plaid Launches Exchange to Help Banks Share Data with 
Fintechs, AM. BANKER (May 19, 2020 12:32 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ 
plaid-launches-exchange-to-help-banks-share-data-with-fintechs [https://perma.cc/2PN4-
QMXB] [hereinafter Crosman, Plaid Launches Exchange]. 
164 Id.  
165 Id. 
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Figure 3. 
Plaid Exchange Platform166  
 
Likewise, trade groups are starting to shape their views into developed 
principles with respect to data aggregation.167 After all, APIs are viewed as a way to 
allow for innovation to thrive while providing more security by using data 
aggregators as intermediaries.168 
This API-based compromise solution seems to strike a delicate balance. Still 
some FinTech companies do not want to work with existing APIs, criticizing them 
                                                   
166 Niko Karvounis & Jesse Dhillon, Introducing Plaid Exchange, PLAID BLOG (May 
20, 2020), https://blog.plaid.com/introducing-plaid-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/H9DS-
D4WB]. 
167  See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, SIFMA DATA AGGREGATION 
PRINCIPLES 1 (2018), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/sifma-Data-
Aggregation-Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZUU-DHPG] (affirming that consumers can 
“use third-parties to access their financial account data” and “such access should be safe and 
secure”). See also Ron Barasch, Yodlee, Quovo and Morningstar ByAllAccounts: Statement 
of Joint Principles for Ensuring Consumer Access to Financial Data, ENVESTNET|YODLEE 
(May 11, 2018), https://www.yodlee.com/blog/envestnet-yodlee-quovo-and-morningstar-
byallaccounts-statement-of-joint-principles-for-ensuring-consumer-access-to-financial-
data/ [https://perma.cc/5LYH-QQMP] (suggesting a Secure Open Data Access framework 
that consists of the following elements: (i) consumers should be able to access their financial 
data for any legitimate app use; (ii) consumers have to provide affirmative consent in 
connection with the use of their data; (iii) all parties that deal with consumer data must 
comply with the best practices for security standards and transparency; and (iv) the party 
liable for a consumer’s financial loss has to compensate the consumer). 
168 See CASTRO & STEINBERG, supra note 156, at 10–11. 
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as hurting innovation by offering too little, too slowly.169 Such FinTech companies 
have not been waiting idly by for banks to reduce API access or pull the plug on data 
entirely. They have instead actively worked on high-tech ways to outsmart and out-
maneuver banks’ blocking technology.170 They have also extended the fight beyond 
technological innovation and into Washington, lobbying for open banking. They 
argue that open banking means that consumers are the owners of their data and 
decide how—and if—they share it with third-parties.171 FinTech companies want 
their apps to ask consumers for permission to access their accounts and require banks 
to abide by that consent and allow their apps to access and manage the data.172 
 
D.  Current Legal Landscape 
 
Ideally, many U.S. banks would prefer to block FinTech companies’ servers 
from accessing customer data. Banks believe FinTech apps collect more data than 
needed, save it in an unsafe way, and sell it to third-parties—all practices that can 
                                                   
169 Discussing the early days of APIs, the advantage of platforms that use them, and the 
network effects that could be generated by this, Peter Menell wrote that  
 
The ability to control interfaces through intellectual property protection, 
technological protections (such as digital rights management), and contracts 
became a major part of these industries. Having innovative, competitively-priced 
products continued to be important, but establishing and building a successful 
software-based platform became the key to success. Companies could use API 
strategies to lock in consumers and lock out competitors. . . . Other computer 
companies used API strategies to control access to their video game platforms, 
cell phone networks, replacement parts (such as ink cartridges for printers), and 
graphical user interfaces. The contours of intellectual property rules governing 
interoperability strategies . . . became a major battleground. 
 
Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright 
Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 305, 318–19 (2018) (footnotes omitted). 
170 Banks notice these maneuvering attempts. For example, PNC started blocking data 
aggregators from accessing its clients’ accounts after identifying “multiple different 
aggregators” trying to bypass its security protocol. See Hayashi, supra note 26 (quotation 
omitted). 
171  See, for example, the advocacy efforts of the Financial Data and Technology 
Association (“FDATA”), a global association of FinTech companies, which has been 
coordinating the campaign for delivery of Open Banking across the globe since 2018, at FIN. 
DATA & TECH. ASS’N, https://fdata.global/ [https://perma.cc/BQ53-7XXX] (last visited July 
7, 2020). See also FDATA North America Mission Statement, FDATA, 
https://fdata.global/north-america/ [https://perma.cc/FCT2-QUPS] (last visited Oct. 4, 
2020).  
172 See Hayashi, supra note 26. 
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lead to the exposure of customers’ account numbers and passwords.173 Banks also 
argue against the FinTech companies’ stance that limiting or regulating their access 
to private data hurts innovation, an argument which some commentators have made 
in various contexts as well.174 The banks believe limiting access to banks’ consumer 
financial data is the best way to promote consumer protection principles and promote 
their clients’ best interests. Based on Cottle vs. Plaid, the class action filed in May 
2020, at least some consumer groups agree that data aggregators’ screen-scraping 
practices must be legally prohibited.175 
 
1.  The Dodd-Frank Act 
 
The legal status of third-parties’ rights to access consumers’ financial data is 
murky in the U.S. Pursuant to the CFPB’s November 2020 advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking (“ANPR”), it is affiliated with the Dodd-Frank Act’s Section 
1033, which provides, “among other things, that subject to rules prescribed by the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), a consumer financial services 
provider must make available to a consumer information in the control or possession 
of the provider concerning the consumer financial product or service that the 
consumer obtained from the provider.”176  The CFPB also issued a request for 
information in November 2016 about market practices related to consumer access to 
financial information, citing to Section 1033, which “provides for consumer rights 
to access financial account and account-related data in usable electronic forms.”177 
In 2016, various financial institutions, as well as the American Bankers Association 
(“ABA”), submitted comment letters in response, questioning Section 1033’s 
applicability to consumer-authorized data access by third-parties as opposed to 
consumers’ direct access.178 Additionally, the ABA discouraged the CFPB from 
                                                   
173 See Jennifer Surane, JPMorgan’s Clampdown on Data Puts Silicon Valley Apps on 
Alert, FIN. ADVISOR (Mar. 26, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/jpmorgan-s-
clampdown-on-data-puts-silicon-valley-apps-on-alert-43982.html?print [https://perma.cc/ 
D42Q-4DWJ]. 
174 See generally Yafit Lev-Aretz & Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy Regulation and 
Innovation Policy, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 256 (forthcoming 2020) (explaining that although 
some industry players argue that privacy regulation will “stifle” innovation, its potential 
impact on innovation does not justify blanket opposition). “[S]ome sorts of privacy 
regulation designed to address misaligned market demand signals can potentially mitigate 
failures of appropriability and provide a more socially beneficial portfolio of innovation 
incentives.” Id. at 256. 
175 See Complaint, Cottle v. Plaid, No. 4:20-cv-03056-DMR (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2020). 
176 See the CPFB’s 2020 ANPR, supra note 68. 
177 See Request for Information Regarding Consumer Access to Financial Records, 81 
Fed. Reg. 83,806 (Nov. 22, 2016).  
178 See E-mail from Robert A. Morgan, Vice President, Emerging Tech., on behalf of 
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engaging in planned Section 1033 rulemaking, as indicated in its 2020 ANPR, 
cautioning that handing over passwords to third-parties is risky. Particularly, the 
ABA stressed that third-parties constantly pulling data from bank servers is 
technologically burdening and could destabilize financial networks.179 
In October 2017, the CFPB released the “Consumer Protection Principles” for 
participants in the developing market for services based on the consumer-authorized 
use of financial data. 180  According to the CFPB, the principles are not legally 
binding rules. Instead, the principles merely express the agency’s “vision for 
realizing a robust, safe, and workable data aggregation market that gives consumers 
protection, usefulness, and value.”181 As such, the principles are intended “to help 
safeguard consumer interests as the consumer-authorized aggregation services 
market develops,” and address issues such as access to data.182 In particular, the 
principles permit consumers to “authorize trusted third parties to obtain” their data 
“from account providers to use on behalf of consumers, for consumer benefit, and 
in a safe manner.”183 The principles also provide guidance for third-party providers 
of services, stressing issues such as protecting consumers’ data from security 
breaches, obtaining clear and informed consent from consumers, and limiting access 
to data to include only necessary information to provide the services consumers 
seek.184 
In its 2018 report, the Treasury Department embraced an expansive approach 
recommending “that the Bureau affirm that for purposes of Section 1033, third 
parties properly authorized by consumers, including data aggregators and consumer 
fintech application providers, fall within the definition of ‘consumer’ under Section 
1002(4) of Dodd-Frank for the purpose of obtaining access to financial account and 
transaction data.”185 But understanding that such regulatory interpretation would 
impact incentives, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) stated in its 
2020 Bulletin that even when  
 
a bank is not receiving a direct service from a data aggregator and if there 
is no business arrangement, banks still have risk from sharing customer-
permissioned data with a data aggregator. Bank management should 
perform due diligence to evaluate the business experience and reputation 
of the data aggregator to gain assurance that the data aggregator maintains 
controls to safeguard sensitive customer data.186 
                                                   
179 Id.  
180 CFPB CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 1–5. 
181 Id. at 1. 
182 Id.  
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 31. 
186  Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bulletin 2020-10: Third-Party 
Relationships: Frequently Asked Questions to Supplement OCC Bulletin 2013-29 (Mar. 5, 
2020), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2020/bulletin-2020-10.html [https:// 
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But FinTech companies and data aggregators want more legal protection from 
Section 1033, believing it preserves their right to pull data from customers’ bank 
accounts.187 Lobbying for that acknowledgment, several FinTech companies and 
data aggregators formed the Consumer Financial Data Rights, advocating for 
consumers’ rights to “innovative products and services that improve their financial 
well-being and are powered by unfettered access to” financial data.188 They claim 
such access to financial data is vital for customers wanting to enjoy financial health 
and allows third-parties to provide better user experiences.189 
 
2.  Who’s the Boss (Agency)? 
 
It seems pretty straightforward that the government agency responsible for 
regulating and supervising consumer financial data sharing should be the CFPB. No 
lead-agency assumes the responsibility for all matters that lay in the intersection of 
finance, technology, and consumer protection. Therefore, in the absence of a 
consumer finance and technology-focused regulator, different administrative 
government agencies have been forced to create regulatory models for governing 
their respective portions of the data economy.190 For example, the FTC and the DOJ 
enforce, inter alia, specific laws that touch upon consumers’ data privacy and 
security and national competition laws.191 The FTC mainly deals with unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, and enforcing specific laws, 
such as COPPA, Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),192 and GLB.193 The DOJ 
                                                   
perma.cc/JGK2-USST]. 
187 Demos, supra note 51. 
188 Envestnet|Yodlee, New Industry Group Established to Support Consumers’ Right to 




189 See id.  
190 See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 14, at 531–32 (exploring what the CFPB has done in 
its first several years to regulate FinTech). 
191  See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Consumer Data Rights and 
Competition—Note by the United States, at 2, DAF/COMP/WD(2020)39 (June 12, 2020), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2020)39/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/E7TY-
EQYB].  
192 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–91. “Congress enacted [the] FCRA 
in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking 
system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 
(2007).  
193 See OECD, supra note 191, at 2.  
 
On the consumer data rights side, the FTC has brought hundreds of cases and 
obtained billions in penalties to protect the privacy and security of consumer data, 
enforcing the FTC Act’s general prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or 
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brings both criminal and civil enforcement actions to protect consumers’ health, 
safety, economic security, identity integrity, and antitrust related issues, which also 
prompted it to file its 2020 lawsuit against Visa and Plaid’s proposed transaction.194 
But unlike the FTC and DOJ, media outlets, various government agencies, and 
even the CFPB itself all believe that the CFPB has the mandate to regulate consumer 
data management.195 This is not surprising. The CFPB has done a great deal to 
regulate FinTech under the umbrella of technology-related issues, particularly its 
2016 request for information about market practices related to access to consumers’ 
financial information.196 The former CFPB Director, Richard Cordray, stressed the 
CFPB’s readiness to protect consumers’ right to share their data with data 
aggregators by executing binding regulations if needed.197 Further supporting this 
                                                   
practices in or affecting commerce.” The FTC also enforces domain specific 
statutes such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 
which restricts collection and use of personal information pertaining to children 
under the age of thirteen, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which protects 
information collected by consumer reporting agencies, and the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1996 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or GLB), which regulates 
the use and dissemination of consumers’ “non-public personal information” by 
“financial institutions,” broadly defined. The FTC also enforces federal 
competition law.  
 
The DOJ’s Civil Division, Consumer Protection Branch, brings both criminal and 
civil enforcement actions to protect consumers’ health, safety, economic security, 
and identity integrity. This work often implicates consumer data and privacy 
rights. The Consumer Protection Branch’s civil authorities include jurisdiction 
over actions referred by the FTC seeking civil penalties under the FTC Act. It also 
has broad criminal authorities to carry out its mission. The DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division has separate authority to enforce the federal competition laws. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
194 Id.; Hrushka, supra note 46. 
195 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5533(e) (stating that the CFPB should consult with the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the OCC, the FDIC, and the FTC to ensure, to 
the extent appropriate, that any regulation based on section 1033 includes similar 
requirements on covered persons, factors into account terms under which covered persons 
do business both in the U.S. and elsewhere, and does not require or promote the use of any 
specific technology in order to develop systems for compliance); An Open Road for Open 
Banking?, PYMNTS (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/news/digital-banking/2020/ 
open-road-for-open-banking/ [https://perma.cc/29PB-VBNE] (explaining that by issuing its 
2020 ANPR, the CFPB signaled its plan to focus on Section 1033 and that more rulemaking 
regarding financial data is on the horizon). 
196 See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 14, at 531. 
197 Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at the Field 
Hearing on Consumer Access to Financial Records (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-cfpb-director-
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notion, Cordray indicated in a different speech in 2016 that the CFPB was prepared 
to and capable of imposing a PSDII-type of regulation if necessary.198 
The CFPB is indeed up for the data management regulation task. Although it 
missed an opportunity to regulate access to financial data when it released non-
binding principles in 2017, which failed to initiate formal regulatory action,199 this 
may be because the CFPB has no authority over antitrust law.200 In the EU, for 
example, the regulator that handled data access in connection with banking also had 
antitrust authority.201 While the CFPB lacks such authority, and many practitioners, 
scholars, and politicians have criticized its legal actions,202 the CFPB’s existence and 
areas of focus should no longer be questioned, even though its leadership structure 
was found unconstitutional following the Seila decision.203  Moreover, no other 
governmental organizations or bureaus seem to have the expertise, legal power, and 
motivation to handle FinTech and consumer protection related issues, such as 
consumer data management.204 Likewise, no other agencies have been suggested to 
potentially take on this regulatory role. Accordingly, the CFPB is the agency that 
should be responsible for consumers’ data management. In that capacity, the CFPB 
should start by focusing on consumer financial data to broaden any such regulation 
to be more comprehensive and expansive as the Australian CDR, which covers the 
management of all consumer data.205 
Starting with and focusing on financial data, the CFPB must conduct periodic 
checks to ensure that data aggregators are operating according to pre-determined 
standards, which it must develop. These checks would enable the bureau to protect 
                                                   
richard-cordray-field-hearing-consumer-access-financial-records [https://perma.cc/7UPG-
4MFE]. 
198 Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at Money 
20/20, (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-
remarks-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-money-2020 [https://perma.cc/2DN5-L9TX] (“[W]e 
are gravely concerned by reports that some financial institutions are looking for ways to 
limit, or even shut off, access to financial data rather than exploring ways to make sure that 
such access, once granted, is safe and secure.”). 
199 CFPB CONSUMER PROTETION, supra note 50, at 1–5. 
200 See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1326 (2017) 
[hereinafter Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator]. 
201  EUR. BANKING AUTH., REPORT ON INNOVATIVE USES OF CONSUMER DATA BY 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 8–16 (2017), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1720 
738/Report+on+Innovative+uses+of+data+2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY98-FF2U]. 
202 See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 69, at 2434. 
203 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
204 See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 49, at 255–57. But 
see Dylan Tokar, FTC to Clarify Its Power to Regulate Big Tech, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 
2019, 5:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-to-clarify-its-power-to-regulate-big-tech-
11568322161 [https://perma.cc/H39X-K3EY] (explaining that the FTC is in the process of 
defining how U.S. competition laws apply to big tech so it can better enforce anti-competitive 
behavior). 
205 For more information about the CDR, see supra note 62. 
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consumers’ privacy.206  But, supervision of large entities that are critical to the 
financial industry, such as data aggregators, might not be enough. Not only does the 
CFPB need to regulate consumer financial data sharing, but it also needs to monitor 
data aggregators and financial data sharing practices because these could cause 
systemic risk. In particular, the globally operated Switzerland-based Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision believes system interconnections between 
banks and FinTech companies “may provide a pathway for a cybersecurity incident 
at a financial technology company to infect the banking system.”207 At the same 
time, operational risks may be of concern when banks have numerous FinTech 
services and relationships. Banks “face ambiguity and uncertainty as to the 
applicability of certain privacy rules, the Bank Secrecy Act provisions and 
regulations, and Anti-Money Laundering Standards” in the face of these 
relationships.208  
 
III.  DATA SHARING: TOO SIGNIFICANT TO BE LEFT UNREGULATED 
 
A.  The U.S. Market-Based Approach 
 
Different from the EU and other places in the world, where a top-down 
regulatory approach concerning consumer financial data sharing has been 
adopted,209 efforts to create standards to better handle data sharing in the U.S. are 
unsurprisingly developing under a market-based approach.210 Whether preferred or 
not,211 a market-based approach in financial regulation characterizes the American 
                                                   
206 See Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State, supra note 67, at 1586. 
207 See COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GEN. ON FIN. OVERSIGHT, supra note 137, at 6.  
208 Id.  
209 See PSDII, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35, supra note 14. 
210  See Karen Bartleson, Market-Driven Standards and the IEEE-SA, 18 IEEE 
INTERNET COMPUTING 58 (2014) (defining the market-driven model as a “model by which 
global standards are created, adopted, and recognized worldwide. In it, the very developers 
and users of technological innovations—as opposed to a centralized body—drive the 
development and adoption of the standards.”). 
211  IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N BD. OF GOVERNORS, IEEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION 
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT: POLICIES ACCEPTING GLOBAL, MARKET-DRIVEN STANDARDS 
SHOULD BE EMBRACED IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISCUSSIONS AND REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 1–2 (2019), http://globalpolicy.ieee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/IEEE1 
8025.pdf [https://perma.cc/94JT-HWLB]. IEEE asserts that 
 
Unlike country-driven standards, the market-driven standards development 
paradigm favors no nation and fosters a global environment where technology 
standards compete for implementation on their own merits. This paradigm of 
market-driven standardization has been proven to ensure strong integration, 
interoperability, and increased synergies along the technological innovation 
chain, while allowing for the representation of the broadest possible cross-section 
of stakeholders.  
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financial markets.212 As part of the efforts taking place in the U.S., banks, FinTech 
companies, and data aggregators have been trying to find middle ground regarding 
consumer financial data sharing. For example, in October 2018, some banks and 
FinTech companies partnered to form the Financial Data Exchange (“FDX”), a 
nonprofit that is a subsidiary of the Financial Services Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (“FS-ISAC”) that attempts to tackle the challenges of securely 
sharing consumers’ financial data.213 The nonprofit’s goal is to develop standards 
for consumer data sharing to preserve security while still motivating innovation.214 
Among other objectives, it tries to think of ways to incorporate the thousands of 
smaller U.S. community banks and credit unions that, when combined together, have 
a significant market share in the financial industry.215 
Similarly, other industry-led initiatives have been taking place to create market-
based solutions, including the creation of a Model Agreement by the Clearing House 
(“TCH”). 216  The TCH agreement is non-binding and helps financial players 
establish legal terms for sharing bank-held consumer data. It facilitates API 
agreements and encourages the adoption of API technology.217 It was developed 
with input from industry participants and is intended to accelerate the legal review 
process during negotiations to ensure that key data security requirements are 
                                                   
Id. 
212 See, e.g., Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach 
to Securities Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1313, 1315–17 (2018) (arguing for an intermediate 
market-based approach towards achieving the optimal level of corporate disclosure rather 
than a pure market-based one). 
213 FS-ISAC, supra note 61. 
214 Id.  
215 See Shevlin, supra note 121 (“Problem is, partnering doesn’t scale. Achieving scale 
requires a platform (like an Amazon or Goldman) who can integrate many providers. . . . 
Being able to create a technology platform to do this has been beyond the reach of most 
banks and credit unions.”). 
216 See TCH Gives Banks an Open Banking Template, PYMNTS (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pymnts.com/data/2019/tch-gives-banks-an-open-banking-template/ [https://per 
ma.cc/TX6Q-QKYQ]. Considering how APIs have developed historically, 
 
[O]nly the largest banks have had the resources—and the time—to devote to the 
extensive and technical application programming interface (API) integration, 
testing and compliance, and the legal and contractual reviews necessary to meet 
FI standards for data sharing . . . . That has left smaller FIs [financial institutions], 
without those resources, at a competitive disadvantage. After a year-long effort to 
address this disparity, TCH released a template . . . designed to help banks link 




217 See Model Data Access Agreement, supra note 60, at 1–2.  
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understood.218 The agreement aims to reduce the need to negotiate the same terms 
each time parties enter into an agreement,219 and the use of it is voluntary.220 Finally, 
specific banks and data aggregators have also been trying to work together and create 
all sorts of other joint programs and understandings.221  
But market-led initiatives are not enough. The U.S. should regulate consumer 
financial data sharing, addressing key issues that should not be left for the markets 
to solve.  
 
1.  Issues with Consumer Financial Data Sharing 
 
(a)  Banks’ Liability  
 
Banks have tried to create obstacles for third-parties to access their customers’ 
accounts and data.222 One of the main reasons banks push back is that the “use of a 
third-party service provider does not” reduce banks’ responsibility to ensure the 
activities are performed in a safe manner and in compliance with the appropriate 
laws, just as if the banks were to conduct the activities in-house.223 Therefore, the 
key issue for banks when dealing with third-party service providers, FinTech 
companies or data aggregators, is liability. 
In the November 2019 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report, the 
banks’ concerns were echoed: 
 
With more parties and intermediaries involved in the provision of financial 
services in an open banking model, it is more difficult to assign liability 
and the amount of damages to the customer, if any. The level of clarity and 
granularity of regulations governing customer redress vary across 
jurisdictions and, in some cases, may not have been updated to take open 




Banks may face reputational risk, even in jurisdictions where there are 
established liability rules. Many banks view themselves as custodians of 
                                                   
218 See TCH Gives Banks an Open Banking Template, supra note 216. 
219 Id.  
220 Id.  
221 See, e.g., Increase Customers’ Control, supra note 60 (“With this new agreement, 
Envestnet|Yodlee is committing to send 100% of its requests for Chase customer data 
through the bank’s secure API, or application programming interface. This will ensure the 
apps can receive Chase customer data they need while customers control what’s shared with 
whom.”). 
222 See Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, supra note 200, at 1286. 
223 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 74. 
224 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 58, at 7. 
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their customers’ data and customers place great confidence in the banks’ 
ability to safeguard their data. In addition, customers often turn to the 
regulated entity ([i.e.,] their bank) first with complaints and disputes, even 
if the third-party is responsible for the erroneous transaction or data 
breach.225 
 
Likewise, as mentioned above, banks face uncertainty regarding the applicability of 
various privacy laws, such as the Bank Secrecy Act, and anti-money laundering 
standards in connection with their relationships with FinTech companies and data 
aggregators.226 The banks are not sure which privacy and confidentiality rules apply, 
to which entity, and to what extent, and do not want to be liable for consumers’ 
privacy violations and damages.227 
 
(b)  Consumer Informed Consent  
 
The process of accessing customers’ bank accounts to retrieve their data is 
based on the customers giving their account credentials to the non-bank as a third-
party.228 It is questionable, however, if customers give informed consent for this 
process to take place creating a major problem.229 In fact, it is not clear if customers 
even understand that a FinTech app and their bank are not the only ones involved in 
each financial transaction engaged in by consumers, or who else they are giving 
consent to access their data.230 As mentioned above, many consumers do not know 
what data aggregators are or what they do. 
The absence of informed consent is a problem. Following the 2008 crisis, it 
became widely accepted that consumer informed consent and disclosure are critical, 
especially when dealing with FinTech companies and other non-bank financial 
institutions, to guarantee the safe functioning of our financial markets.231 Therefore, 
Dodd-Frank Act sections 115(f) and 165(d) granted the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and the Federal Reserve Board the legal ability to mandate additional 
                                                   
225 Id. 
226 See COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GEN. ON FIN. OVERSIGHT, supra note 137, at 6.  
227 See Crosman, Finra’s Dire Warning, supra note 36. 
228 Id. 
229 This issue is at the heart of the lawsuit alleging that no consent has been given. See 
Complaint at 50, Cottle v. Plaid, No. 4:20-cv-03056-DMR (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2020). 
Likewise, this lack of understanding has been the central issue in an October 2020 lawsuit 
filed by TD Bank against Plaid, in which the bank claimed Plaid mimicked its login page in 
an effort to “dupe” its customers, who were linking their bank accounts to payment apps, 
believing they are entering their personal data into TD’s platform. See Hrushka, supra note 
47. Moreover, studies have shown that most consumers do not know of data aggregators’ 
involvement in their FinTech app interaction. See 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 
25. 
230 See 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 25, and Berry, supra note 68. 
231 See Packin & Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks, supra note 12, at 1277–78. 
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periodic public disclosures of all financial companies including FinTech entities in 
order to “support market evaluation of the risk profile, capital adequacy, and risk 
management capabilities thereof.”232 Likewise, the CFPB has dealt with the issue of 
transparency from different angles and through various tools.233 Much like banks 
and other traditional financial institutions, data aggregators such as Plaid should also 
be required to abide by transparency and disclosure requirements and policies.  
But disclosure is not enough. 
 
It is a widely acceptable notion that most consumers do not read these 
guidelines, policies, and terms of service. This notion is generally 
supported by empirical studies, anecdotal evidence, and the reported 
personal record of legal scholars and judges. Reasons for not reading vary 
and range from lack of interest and difficulty in understanding the legal 
language, to the time consuming nature of those contracts and consumers’ 
nonexisting bargaining power. When a great number of consumers all 
enjoy the same product under the same contract, users are further 
incentivized not to read because they feel reassured that the terms must be 
reasonable.234 
 
In the context of FinTech transactions operated via data aggregators’ services, 
the problem of fictional consent235 is worsened. Consumers do not know what data 
                                                   
232 Id. (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §115(f), 124 Stat. 1367, 1406 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325(f))). 
233 Id. at 1283.  
234 Id. at 1279 (footnotes omitted). Lev-Artez and I concluded earlier, 
 
Real people don’t read standard form contracts. Reading is boring, 
incomprehensible, alienating, time consuming, but most of all pointless. We want 
the product, not the contract. Besides, lots of people bought the product or the 
service along with the same contract and seem happy enough, so we presume that 
there must be nothing particularly important buried in the contract terms. 
 
Id. Accord Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law 1–4 
(John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 415, 2008). 
235 Margaret Jane Radin, Comment, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the 
Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006). Considering how online services 
purport to obtain user consent, 
 
Consent is fictional when the terms are filed somewhere we cannot access, as in 
airline tariffs. Consent is fictional when almost all of us click on-screen boxes 
affirming that we have read and understood things we have not read and would 
not understand if we did. Consent is fictional on websites whose terms of service 
state that just by browsing the site, whether or not one ever clicks on the terms, 
one has agreed to whatever the terms say, now or as they may be changed in the 
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aggregators are or their involvement in transactions. They also cannot directly 
connect FinTech apps with their banks in the same way they directly communicated 
with their banks. Furthermore, often in the digital content world, terms of service 
enable the provider to revise its terms at any given point in time236—a practice that, 
if used by data aggregators, would not only place users more at risk, but also 
contradict common understandings of contract law doctrines and financial 
institutions’ disclosure obligations.237 
“From a legal and policy perspective, users should be aware of the product they 
buy and the price they pay for it—be it in actual money, money equivalences, time 
(e.g., to fill out a survey), or personal information.”238 The cybersecurity, privacy, 
and financial harm dangers posed by screen-scraping are a great example of a 
significant price consumers may pay in exchange for being able to access FinTech 
apps’ services or products. Paying a significant price and exposing themselves to 
different potential harms and dangers seems more reasonable when consumers make 
a choice to bind themselves to the conditions knowingly and willingly, after hearing 
the possible options and consequences. “When the terms of the service are 
successfully communicated, consumers, either individually or through the formation 
of advocacy groups, can propose stipulations, and the dialogue between those 
networks and their consumers is kept viable and open.”239 The current norms that 
data aggregators have developed in connection with using consumers’ bank account 
credentials, which might not be based on clear and informed consumer consent, and 
screen-scraping consumers’ financial data, 240  should not be legally or socially 
accepted. 
Given the above, many commentators have criticized the practice of screen-
scraping,241 arguing that APIs offer a more secure method of accessing financial 
                                                   
future. Consent is fictional when the contract ends, as one I saw recently did, with 
“By reading the above you have agreed to it.” 
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236 See, e.g., Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 495 F.3d 1062, 
1067 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing whether a service provider may change the terms of its 
service contract by posting a changed contract on its site with no additional notice). The court 
determined that service provider’s customers should not be bound by revised terms in 
absence of notice. Id.  
237 See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online 
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 704–05 (2010) (suggesting that 
traditional preconditions to contracting are not being met online). 
238 See Packin & Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks, supra note 12, at 1280. 
239 Id. at 1279. Accord Ben-Shahar, supra note 234, at 1–4. 
240 This is in part what the lawsuit against Plaid alleges. See Complaint at 13, 50, Cottle 
v. Plaid, N.D. Cal., No. 4:20-cv-03056-DMR, (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2020). 
241 Scrapers have been described in various ways, including: (i) an invading army of 
robots in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 
2000); (ii) a person walking into a bank with both a safety deposit key and a shotgun in 
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016); and (iii) an 
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information. Similarly, various jurisdictions have promoted access to such data 
through APIs. In the U.S., however, the legal environment surrounding data scraping 
is still evolving.242 Differently, the U.K., via its open banking initiative, has provided 
detailed standards for data sharing through APIs,243 and Singapore has promoted the 
use of bank APIs although it has not made it a regulatory mandate.244 Similarly, in 
the EU, rules implementing PSDII proposed by the European Banking Authority 
would require banks to permit certified third-parties to access consumer data only 
via APIs and ban screen-scraping.245 PSDII also contemplates the standardization of 
APIs.246 This is not surprising. Unlike the U.S., the implementation of open banking 
in the EU is based on the region’s strict data protection laws, which require informed 
consent from customers before their account data can be shared with third-parties 
using APIs. Under the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), banks will be 
responsible not only for informing customers of how their data may be used by such 
third-parties, but also for creating specific contractual and technical safeguards to 
guarantee that third-parties do not disclose or reuse the information without further 
approval from customers.247 
                                                   
interviewer using a tape recorder instead of writing down notes in Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 
F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2018). 
242  See generally Brainard, supra note 89 (analogizing the developing legal 
environment to the unpredicted advent of smartphone platforms). The 9th Circuit’s 2019 
decision in the hiQ Labs case sets back the battle against “data scraping.” Jonathan Stempel, 
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244 Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Dir., Monetary Auth. of Sing., Remarks at the 
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companies. Antony Peyton, No EC Love for European Banks’ Screen Scraping Ban Plan, 
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european-banks-screen-scraping-ban-plan/ [https://perma.cc/8H5R-5322]. The European 
Banking Federation proposed a ban on screen-scraping, equating aggregator logins using 
consumer user names and passwords to “impersonating” consumers. EBF asks Commission 
to Support Ban on Screen-scraping, EUR. BANKING FED’N (May 16, 2017), https://www.ebf. 
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246 See PSDII, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35, supra note 14. 
247  Brian Hurh, Adam D. Maarec & Chris Chamness, Consumer Financial Data 
Aggregation and the Potential for Regulatory Intervention, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 20, 
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One particular area of concern in connection with screen-scraping is it adds a 
layer of security concerns to an already alarming problem. Screen-scraping increases 
cybersecurity and fraud risks as individuals provide their secure login credentials to 
access FinTech apps, 248  partly because providing login credentials to data 
aggregators makes it easier for bad actors to get their hands on the credentials to 
move assets out of accounts.249 
Therefore, the U.S. should adopt regulation based on APIs and mandate that 
both banks and third parties must disclose information, alert consumers, and require 
them to give consent, in different and multiple steps of their transactions with 
FinTech companies. After all, such an EU-like policy, where banks/Fintechs are 
responsible not only for informing customers how their data may be used by such 
third parties, but also for creating specific contractual and technical safeguards to 
guarantee third parties do not disclose or reuse the information without further, 
explicit approval from customers, has become an imperative.250 
 
(c)  Innovating or Getting More Data than Needed?  
 
Data aggregators and FinTech companies look at individual financial data to 
innovate and offer superior and more efficient or cost-effective services and 
products. Yet, banks have data entries, which they would want the CFPB to consider 
as proprietary and thus designate as items that cannot be shared—such as pricing, 
interest rates, or fee information. Consequently, not getting access to such items 
would probably limit FinTech companies’ abilities to innovate the products and 
services currently provided by banks. The consumers will miss out on some 
innovative offerings. 
Likewise, on their quest to get information, screen-scraping enables data 
aggregators to get more data than needed, including sensitive personally identifiable 
information that can be subsequently stolen or misused,251 in which case the banks 
                                                   
248 See 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 24–25.  
249 See Crosman, Finra’s Dire Warning, supra note 36 (describing how accounts are 
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to identify account numbers. 
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may likely be on the hook. Moving away from screen-scraping can help solve some 
of the liability issues, “eliminating the need for login credentials” and lowering the 
possibility of an unauthorized transaction.252 But currently, the U.S. industry has not 
shifted away from screen-scraping. 
Moreover, in hiQ Labs Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp,253 after LinkedIn asked hiQ to 
stop scraping data from its public website and tried to create a technical barrier to 
prevent the scraping, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled against 
LinkedIn. 254  Nevertheless, certain industry players who understand the dangers 
associated with screen-scraping have started contracting to use APIs, which are 
conditioned upon contractual liability and indemnification of the (concerned) 
financial services company,255  even if doing so is not always easy. Indeed, as 
mentioned, many data aggregators and FinTech companies are not happy about the 
limiting nature of APIs and their dependence on the banks’ good will for access to 
data.256 They argue that their APIs’ access is limited to specific types of data dictated 
by banks, rather than consumers, and push against API agreements’ strict contractual 
liability provisions.257  
As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) noted,258 financial 
responsibilities for consumer losses and access to consumer financial transaction 
data are extremely important issues that must be carefully and quickly addressed. 
Federal banking regulators and the CFPB understand this and have held multiple 
discussions on the topic under the sponsorships of the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (“FFIEC”). 259  No concrete policy or guidelines to direct 
market participants have been agreed upon as of yet, which is problematic for banks 
that do not want to be liable for third-parties’ doings, consumers, Fintech companies, 
and data aggregators.260 As long as the liability issue is not resolved, “consumers 
could have to choose between facing potential losses or not using what they may 
find to be an otherwise valuable financial service, and fintech firms providing useful 
services to consumers will face barriers to providing their offerings more 
broadly.”261 
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(d)  Data Security Issues  
 
Enabling FinTech companies to collect all sorts of information about 
consumers increases cybersecurity concerns. The growing cost, regularity, and 
gravity of data breaches are now key issues in risk management. More than 4,000 
known data breaches have shaken, weakened, and almost paralyzed markets during 
the last decade. 262  Experts believe massive numbers of records encompassing 
confidential or sensitive data have been compromised, and these global data 
breaches cost more than $400 billion annually.263 
Information about financial transactions and social media data present an 
especially appealing target for hackers.264 Large financial institutions obtain, store, 
and maintain noteworthy volumes of personal data. Storage, compilation, and 
transfer of confidential data make financial institutions extremely desirable targets 
for hackers.265 Among the federal laws focusing on the collection, compilation, and 
handling of sensitive data is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”),266 which is 
enforced by the federal banking agencies for depository institutions,267 the SEC, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the FTC. 268  These 
agencies all maintain authority to implement regulations for GLBA, and all agencies 
but the FTC can also supervise and examine compliance.269 
But data security standards are completely different for non-financial business 
entities like retailers or manufacturers. Massive amounts of financial data that 
includes consumer payment credentials are regularly saved on non-financial 
business entities’ internal or third-party databases used for various promotion and 
marketing purposes or to rapidly conduct transactions.270 Such entities, however, 
need not comply with broad federal data security standards under GLBA or be 
constantly monitored. Their main obligation to protect data results from the FTC’s 
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exercised authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,271 which 
enables the FTC to enforce actions against nonfinancial business entities for unfair 
or deceptive practices. Since 2002, the FTC has exercised its power to enforce 
actions more than 60 times,272 but because its power is restricted to enforcement 
action, the agency cannot supervise or examine nonfinancial companies on an 
ongoing basis.273  
All businesses are subject to state laws, however, and those can include specific 
data security standards. But as of 2019, only a little over a dozen states have imposed 
various data security standards to protect consumer financial data,274 and some are 
extremely weak. For example, Florida mandates business entities to take “reasonable 
measures” to protect and secure people’s private information collected in “electronic 
form,” and Utah does not distinguish between personal data saved on paper versus 
electronically.275 
These few and weak laws are not effective. In the last decade, multiple 
nonfinancial business entities suffered from major data breaches of consumer 
financial data. One example was Target in 2013, which publicized that the payment 
card data of “[a]pproximately 40 million” accounts was compromised.276 Similarly, 
in 2014, Home Depot revealed that a data breach resulted in the theft of card 
payment information of more than 50 million consumers.277 Likewise, the parent 
entity of Lord & Taylor and Saks Fifth Avenue reported that the payment credentials 
of 5 million of its customers were compromised.278 Such data breaches have affected 
financial institutions as well.279 
                                                   
271 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 




273 See id. at 1 (describing scope of FTC’s privacy and protection work). 
274 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 39.  
275 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(2) (West 2019), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
44-201 (West 2019). 
276 Press Release, Target Corp., Target Confirms Unauthorized Access to Payment 
Card Data in U.S. Stores (Dec. 19, 2013), https://corporate.target.com/press/releases/2013/ 
12/target-confirms-unauthorized-access-to-payment-car [https://perma.cc/3Q2J-MF6Z]. 
277 Press Release, The Home Depot, The Home Depot Reports Finding in Payment Data 
Breach Investigation (Nov. 6, 2014), http://ir.homedepot.com/news-releases/2014/11-06-
2014-014517315 [https://perma.cc/P49V-WRY6]. 
278 Mike Murphy, Saks, Lord & Taylor Data Breach May Affect 5 Million Customers, 
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 1, 2018, 5:23 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/saks-lord-
taylor-data-breach-may-affect-5-million-customers-2018-04-01 [https://perma.cc/Q5Z4-
UVYE]. 
279 For instance, JPMorgan Chase suffered a data breach in 2014 and Equifax in 2017. 
See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Matthew Goldstein & Nicole Perlroth, JPMorgan Chase 
Hacking Affects 76 Million Households, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:50 PM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-
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There is no federal law creating uniform nationwide standards for alerting 
consumers about data breaches or for providing simple dispute solving 
mechanisms.280 Given this regulatory vacuum, states create their own data breach 
notification rules, which apply to businesses located in their jurisdictions or 
transacting with their residents.281  Therefore, if data breaches occur, businesses 
could be subject to more than 50 different notification laws.282 State laws for data 
breach notification typically provide details regarding the number of impacted 
consumers that will result in notification requirements, as well as the notification’s 
timing and procedure.283 But state data breach notification laws vary greatly and 
include substantively different provisions regarding the nature of data defined as 
personal information.284 These variations among the laws cause inefficiencies and 
make compliance challenging for both non-financial businesses and financial 
institutions, resulting in disparate treatment for consumers. 285  While Congress 
attempted to create relevant federal uniform standards a number of times, including 
during the 114th Congress,286 no law has been established yet, and no uniform 
national standards exist. Therefore, consumer financial data is not properly 
protected. 
Lastly, as far as third-parties are concerned, financial institutions are worried 
about being liable for any potential harms associated with data being used by, 
transferred, sold to, or hacked or exploited by third-parties. Not only can third-
parties intentionally choose to take unregulated actions that would prove harmful 
and successfully dodge liability, but horrific consequences can also happen without 
                                                   
issues/ [https://perma.cc/9Q6J-HHQR]; Tara Siegel Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole Perlroth 
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TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-
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70 Fed. Reg. 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
281 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 39–40. 
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286 Data Security Act of 2015, H.R. 2205, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and 
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intentional action. Attackers keep searching for the weakest links in the information 
supply chain and often attempt to hack or harm entities and institutions by indirectly 
attacking related third-parties or backdoor channels.287 Third-party providers and 
websites are exposed to, maintain, and even carry large amounts of data about 
consumers, making them targets as well.288  Another problem is that businesses 
across various industries have become so interconnected and interdependent that 
hackers can attack advanced cybersecurity systems of bigger businesses by turning 
to smaller businesses without vigorous protection.289 These smaller businesses may 
be third-parties and may hold valuable data. “For example, the hack into the Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM) was the result of IT system access through a third 
party.”290 
 
(e)  Consumers’ Privacy & Contextual Integrity 
 
The expanded access to financial and non-financial data enabled by the shift 
towards open banking raises critical issues with respect to protecting the 
confidentiality of consumers’ data. The EU’s GDPR attempts to address some of 
these concerns by creating a fundamental right to privacy that includes people’s right 
to have their data deleted and transferred, among other provisions.291 Similarly, the 
Australian CDR292 creates a singular consumer right that enables all institutions to 
                                                   
287  N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NAVIGATING THE DIGITAL AGE: THE DEFINITIVE 
CYBERSECURITY GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 207–12 (2015), https://www.nyse. 
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of Single Sign-On Account Hijacking and Session Management on the Web, 27 USENIX 
Sec. Symp. 1475, 1475–76, 1489 (2018), https://www.cs.uic.edu/~polakis/papers/sso-
usenix18.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3E2-2WHW]. 
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perma.cc/P62C-VKFG] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
290 See Packin, supra note 134, at 1258. 
291 Because the GDPR has raised a number of questions about implementation for 
companies that hold people’s data, lack of regulatory clarity with its implementation may 
add barriers to trade and hurt cross-border regulatory cooperation. See, e.g., Wilbur Ross, 
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connect to other data systems. 293  But even with laws in place, issues such as 
consumer disclosure, consent, and termination appear challenging to handle.294 
Consumers’ authorization should be the legal basis for accessing their financial 
data. 295  But consumers cannot make informed choices in the absence of a 
transparent, comprehensible, and accessible disclosure. Without one, it is impossible 
to understand the risks, costs, and benefits of using FinTech apps and enable third-
parties to access and use consumers’ personal and financial data.296 Some FinTech 
apps and data aggregators offer hard-to-follow disclosures on what data will be 
collected and how it will be used and saved. In other situations, the disclosures, 
terms, and conditions may be difficult to find or they may be described in such 
legalistic terms that consumers will find themselves lost and skip to the “accept” 
button, or simply reject the product. 297  Since most consumers increasingly use 
FinTech apps on their smartphones, the chances that they will read and comprehend 
long, detailed disclosures on their phones diminishes. 298  Moreover, even if 
“[d]isclosures written in plain language might increase consumer awareness . . . that 
only works if consumers actually read the ‘Terms and Conditions’ before 
downloading the latest financial app.”299 
However, consumers typically do not read disclosures,300 and many disclosure 
critics believe not reading is the rational thing to do,301 because they do not matter. 
Many prefer convenience over security and continue to rely on their banks for the 
protection of their data.302 This should alert banks as it means banks must confirm 
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that their customers understand the meaning of legally permitting third-parties to 
access their accounts or initiate transactions. Moreover, data aggregators often get 
more information than necessary when providing the consumers’ requested products 
and services. 
Lastly, disclosures may not be useful if consumers are unaware of the 
relationships underlying the services and products they are using. For instance, for 
FinTech apps that rely on data aggregators to get or process consumers’ financial 
information, the role of data aggregators may be completely opaque to consumers. 
This issue touches upon the legitimacy of the practice of collection and use of 
information about unsuspecting individuals by third-parties. 
A benchmark theory of privacy sheds light on the legitimacy of such a 
practice.303 Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity theory304 offers a conceptual 
framework of protected private information in connection with the norms of 
information flow within particular contexts.305 The theory rejects the traditional 
distinction of public versus private information. Instead, the theory suggests that 
data-sharing activities present themselves in a “plurality of distinct realms,” all of 
which are governed by norms of information flow that define the contours of our 
essential entitlements regarding personal information.306 The theory differentiates 
between two types of informational norms: norms of appropriateness and norms of 
flow or distribution.307 Norms of appropriateness define if the information of a 
specific type is appropriate for disclosure in a given context. 308  In addition to 
determining appropriateness based on context, contextual integrity also considers if 
the distribution or flow of the information follows the contextual norms of 
information flow. 309  Accordingly, privacy is invaded when these informational 
norms are violated. 
In the open banking context, norms of appropriateness are ignored when data 
aggregators collect and use banks’ customers’ financial information that the 
customers shared with their FinTech companies in the interest of using a certain app. 
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Norms of information flow are also breached because individuals are generally 
unaware of data aggregators and do not expect such a use of their financial 
information at the specific points of when information is created or when their 
relationship with the FinTech companies’ apps begin. Put differently, their right to 
privacy is violated due to the unexpected flow of personal and financial information 
from entities that they reasonably expect to collect and use the financial information 
(e.g., FinTech companies offering apps) to other entities (e.g., data aggregators) that 
use the same information for various purposes. This is especially the case because 
consumers often do not have easy ways to revoke their consent to data aggregators’ 
access to their information.310 Hence, data aggregators may continue to save, use, 
and even collect information without the consumers having any control over the 
scope and duration of data being obtained, how it is used, and who gets it. 
The contextual integrity theory is directly dependent on individual and societal 
privacy expectations and those are highly susceptible to changes over time. Thus, if 
data aggregators grow to become widely-known, widely-accepted players in the 
financial ecosystem (and perhaps even recognized gatekeepers of sorts), many of the 
arguments listed above would lose much of their strength because the use of 
financial and personal information for other purposes would no longer be utterly 
outside the purview of an individual’s expectations. The more people become 
familiar with data aggregators and their services, the more accepted their practices 
will be. 
 
(f)  Tech and Discrimination-Related Issues  
 
Because of the way they are designed, digital technologies tend to perpetuate 
historical systems of discrimination.311 Since consumer financial data can play a role 
in all aspects of life—finance, insurance, employment, education, medicine, and 
much more—we need to be careful about who has access to it and how it is being 
used. As third-party data brokers accumulate massive amounts of data and share it, 
even if there are categories of data that are protected, processing such large amounts 
of data often creates the existence of proxies that allow for discrimination against 
protected classes within or among systems. 312  The problem is, however, that 
individuals and private sector entities all rely on algorithmic decisions, which 
typically do not explain their decision-making processes or their reasoning, and 
make determinations that could be discriminatory, based on the design of and 
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assumptions in the algorithms, or data they worked with.313 Likewise, public sector 
entities also rely on algorithmic systems for various purposes.314  
In addition to the potential discriminatory harm for consumers, banks would 
not want to be legally liable for discrimination-related harms, which are based on 
third-parties’ improper usages of data, especially since banks are legally required to 
allocate many resources to comply with binding anti-discrimination legislation.315 
But without proper regulation, banks or consumers will not be able to prevent third-
party data brokers from using consumers’ financial data in discriminatory ways, or 
stop “invasions of personal autonomy, existing or prospective, that information 
technology now makes possible . . . . [because] the basic safeguards cannot be 
provided by new inventions. They must be provided by the legislative and legal 
systems of this country.”316 
 
(g)  Market Power and Competition-related Issues 
 
The banks’ main concern about FinTech companies operating in the financial 
industry results from wanting to maintain their own competitive advantage. In some 
ways, it is the same old story of the incumbent versus the disruptor. Some 
commentators argue that the competitive advantage issue was the key factor in the 
Visa-Plaid deal,317 as banks object to giving their customers’ data away to FinTech 
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companies, 318  and risk losing the customers. Analyzing the Visa-Plaid deal, 
worrying about limiting competition, and consequently hurting innovation, the DOJ 
determined that without its interference, data aggregators will cooperate with, or get 
acquired by, strong financial institutions such as the major credit card companies, 
and serve their interests.319  But in such circumstances, the interests of the data 
aggregators are those of their bigger customers—banks—and they will stop 
supporting FinTech companies to continue to innovate.320 
Likewise, businesses with more customer information have stronger control 
over their customers. Understanding this, banks want to share with FinTech 
companies only the bare minimum. For example, since Zelle is owned and operated 
jointly by several big banks, banks prefer to have Zelle act as the front-end, rather 
than a data aggregator, which would obtain a great deal of information about many 
of the banks’ customers.321 Pushing against data aggregators, PNC Bank decided in 
2019 to block their customers’ access to Venmo, Zelle’s rival payment app.322  
  
                                                   
quietly kill it. Who makes money for Visa? Their issuing banks and credit unions. Who are 
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318 See Pedersen, supra note 98 (describing how the biggest banks’ CEOs believe that 
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320  See Crosman, Mastercard and Visa Gobble Up, supra note 34. According to 
industry leaders, 
 
“If more moats are created to control personal financial information, there will be 
no ability for new businesses to create value around this data, let alone consumers 
having the ability to cross the water toward new value.” Leimer pointed out that 
these two mergers will likely slow down the pace of innovation for the acquired 
firms, at least until the each deal and all its ramifications are worked out. Another 
issue, in his view, is control and lack of choice. “When large data platforms 
become larger through acquisition or broader business extension, we lose choices, 
both in founders of new fintech firms and developers of new financial 
applications,” he said. “We need to continue to see, at least in the U.S., given how 
many financial institutions still exist, innovation that helps develop consumer 
value around savings, income and spend optimization, and long-term wealth 
creation through investments.” 
 
Id. (quoting Brad Leimer, co-founder of Unconventional Ventures).  
321 Stacy Cowley, Cash Faces a New Challenger in Zelle, a Mobile Banking Service, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/dealbook/mob 
ile-banking-zelle-venmo-apple-pay.html [https://perma.cc/A2JL-HWC9].    
322 See Hayashi, supra note 26. 
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(i)  Market Size and Volume 
 
Even if the incumbents try to maintain their advantage non-competitively, the 
winds are changing in the financial industry in recent years. The growing size of 
technology companies in the financial industry has been impossible to miss. 
Covering more products, services, and populations, technology companies have 
raised attention and capital. For example, valuations of the biggest private 
companies expanded significantly that by 2019, there were 39 venture capital-
backed FinTech unicorns—companies valued at more than one billion dollars—
“worth a combined $147.37 billion”;323 compared to at least six of the 39 FinTech 
companies reaching unicorn status in the U.S. in 2018.324 Moreover, U.S. FinTech 
companies raised 43% more capital than in 2017, and globally, FinTech companies 
entered into more than 1,700 deals worth nearly $40 billion.325 However, being the 
incumbents, banks already have a great deal of information on consumers and 
businesses. Therefore, the banking industry’s recent push against technology 
companies is at least partially driven by the tremendous disruption that these 
companies are causing to the landscape of the financial industry. Companies like 
Mint, for example, provide consumers with an aggregated snapshot of their accounts 
from multiple financial institutions. 326  Without access to banks’ data, Mint’s 
business would collapse. Thus, if banks try to avoid losing ground by choking off 
the data, they put tremendous pressure on FinTech companies and can potentially 
drive some out of business. Most FinTech companies are dependent on access to 
banks’ data. As a result, FinTech companies started lobbying against the banks’ 
reluctance to grant them access to customer data, arguing that it hurts the consumer 
and stifles innovation.327 
 
(ii)  Bi-Directional Flow of Data – Learn from Australia 
 
In the U.S. and the EU’s PSDII, open banking has been promoted as a one-
sided initiative. Moreover, open banking has been described as a seismic shift for 
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FinTech companies.328 Consequently, banks are fighting the demands for a uni-
directional flow of data, arguing that such a one-sided initiative is problematic, not 
only for their business operations, but also because it does not serve the consumers’ 
best interests.329 The more consumers adopt FinTech’s products and services, the 
more banks will want and need access to FinTech’s data to properly serve their 
customers and be able to fully connect information about investments, insurance, 
loans, etc., back to their own databases. Moreover, consumers might expect and want 
to see that information gets shared with their banks as well. 
This consumer-facing bi-directional flow of data is one of the key premises in 
the Australian CDR, which creates a singular consumer right.330 The CDR allows 
individuals and business consumers to access data on their own consumption of 
goods and services. Thus, the law enables “consumers to direct custodians to share 
their data with accredited entities, which have ‘satisfactory security and privacy 
safeguards’ in place.” 331  Also, importantly, the definition of CDR data is 
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AUSTL., REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING IN AUSTRALIA 3, (2019), https://treasury.gov.au/sites 
/default/files/2019-03/T282002-Data-Governance-Australia.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPD6-
ACEU]. Therefore, the intended data flow would be bi-directional, i.e. banks will share their 
data with FinTech companies, which in return will share their data with banks. The CDR’s 
goal is to “improve customer choice and convenience by allowing data to be shared with 
third parties,” as it is believed that this will increase competition in all the participating 
sectors, such as banking, and would enable consumers to obtain greater value for their 
money. See The Treasury, Austl. Gov’t, Consumer Data Right – Fact Sheet, 
https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/02/180208-CDR-Fact-Sheet-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WH5M-N2DC] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). In addition, it is believed that 
the two-way sharing nature of the law “will improve the flow of information in the economy 
and encourage the development of new products and applications that reach more consumers 
and are better tailored to their needs.” THE TREASURY, AUSTL. GOV’T, CONSUMER DATA 
RIGHT 2 (2018), https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/t286983_consumer-data-
right-booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/985Z-E2WK]. 
331 Adam Salter & Prudence Smith, How Does Australia’s New Consumer Data Right 
Work?, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (May 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/05 
/australia-consumer-data-right [https://perma.cc/9TXW-8XNL]. But some commentators 
have criticized the mandatory two-way data sharing, arguing, for example, that  
 
1. [Mandatory two-way data sharing] would undermine new and competing 
business models through enforced levelling of any strategic advantage such as line 
item data from credit card transactions that are appended by a fintech then having 
to be shared back to the Financial Institution; 2. For efficiency-seeking and 
strategic reasons, over time Data Holders may not support any other modes of 
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intentionally broad and includes all data that relates to the consumer, regardless of 
whether it was created or collected inside or outside Australia.332 It is part of an 
Australian effort to give consumers access to and “the ability to transfer their 
personal data to third parties. . . . [B]anking is just the beginning. Not only will it 
include more types of financial product than seen elsewhere—eventually it will 
cover mortgages, loans and investments” and go even further to include telco and 
utility data.333 So while the CDR requires the biggest banks to release APIs that grant 
access to credit card transaction and deposit account data, a general consensus exists 
in Australia regarding the bi-directional flow of the data initiative.334  
 
(h)  The Need for an Industry Standard 
 
Understanding that standardization is key, industry players have attempted to 
collaboratively create standardized data elements for financial products and 
services.335 In addition to helping address liability issues, standardization could raise 
market efficiency, as it would make it easier to conduct comparative analysis of 
                                                   
data sharing than under CDR Open Banking, and if current drafting holds, ensures 
that more valuable data from the Data Recipient has to be reciprocated; and 3. 
data equivalency issues . . . . In addition to increasing overhead costs, the 
reciprocity concept would erode innovation by transferring participants’ flows of 
enhanced data directly to competitors. Should enhanced start-up and fintech data 
be made freely available to the wider market, replication of products and services 
is possible, which will ultimately discourage innovation. Therefore it is 
reasonable to expect the reciprocity concept will further entrench established 
participants in an already highly concentrated market, leaving little incentive to 
drive better outcomes for the customer. Unless legislation is designed to protect 
intellectual property to encourage new product offerings in isolation from 
competitors, there is little reason for start-ups and fintechs to become CDR 
participants, or start new ventures within the initiative framework. 
 
Submission from Ian Boyd, Fin. Indus. Dir., Xero Australia, to the Senate Econ. Comm. on 
Open Banking (2019), https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=492d8f37-777a-
4639-9dea-214d83c2b73c&subId=666878 [https://perma.cc/4Z7M-SX29]. 
332  Data may even become subject to the CDR through a reciprocity mechanism, 
meaning those who wish to become accredited and receive designated data at a consumer’s 
request must be willing to share equivalent data, in response to a consumer’s request. The 
detail and extent of reciprocity is dealt with under the CDR rules. See Explanatory 
Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (Consumer Data Right) Bill 2019 (Cth) 16–18 
& 25–26, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A% 
22legislation%2Fems%2Fr6281_ems_58a7c56b-36e3-4388-acf8-58455b983a76%22 
[https://perma.cc/GCX7-T6MH]. 
333 Kocianski, supra note 293. 
334 See Salter & Smith, supra note 331;  see also Kocianski, supra note 293. 
335 See Crosman, Plaid Launches Exchange, supra note 163. 
 
2020] SHOW ME THE (DATA ABOUT THE) MONEY! 1337 
compatible and clean data. 336  But while various entities, including the Open 
Financial Exchange (“OFX”) and FS-ISAC, tried to lead standardization attempts,337 
consensus has been hard to reach. 
One hurdle is that any possible solution would likely need to be part of a broader 
regulation meant to enhance consumers’ safe and secure management of their data. 
Thinking of such an approach, market participants have founded the nonprofit 
Financial Data Exchange (“FDX”) in order to move the financial services industry 
towards the adoption of an API standard (“FDX API”) to access consumer financial 
data.338 FinTech apps that employ the FDX API enable individuals to log in and be 
authenticated by their banks.339 According to FDX, the only financial information 
that will be accessed is what consumers have specifically agreed to share with the 
particular FinTech apps they use.340 This enables the FDX API to include only data 
that is truly needed and approved by the users.341 The FDX API attempts to provide 
a framework that enables scalable technology solutions, useful even to small 
financial institutions that wish to offer more tech-driven services at minimal costs. 
The framework is royalty-free to use in perpetuity by all parties.342 
Seeing no regulatory solution in sight, but desperate for solutions in the market-
based American financial services industry, industry participants have been quick to 
adopt the FDX API standard. In November 2019, FDX announced that its 
                                                   
336 Conrad Sheehan, To Capitalize on Open Banking, the Industry Needs Standards, 
AM. BANKER (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/to-capitalize-on-
open-banking-the-industry-needs-standards [https://perma.cc/YA8X-F9CG] (explaining 
that financial services companies typically use “disparate and customized formats to send 
and share information” but arguing that standardization in the financial industry would be 
more effective for capitalizing on APIs). 
337 See FS-ISAC, supra note 61; Press Release, OFX Consortium, supra note 160. 
338 Banking on Your Data: The Role of Big Data in Financial Services: Hearing Before 
the H. Fin. Serv. Comm., 116th Cong. 1–2 (2019) (statement of Don Cardinal, Managing 
Dir., Fin. Data Exch.) [hereinafter Cardinal Statement], https://financialservices.house.gov 
/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-wstate-cardinald-20191121.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y85E-
PVUM]. See also FDX Managing Director Don Cardinal Testifies Before Congress on Big 
Data in Banking and Financial Data Security, PR NEWSWIRE. (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fdx-managing-director-don-cardinal-testifies-
before-congress-on-big-data-in-banking-and-financial-data-security-300963460.html 
[https://perma.cc/V6NX-V4QG] [hereinafter FDX] (explaining that consumer demand for 
FinTech apps drove the innovation in financial services, and FDX believes the entire 
financial ecosystem should enable consumers to use their data safely). 
339 See Cardinal Statement, supra note 338, at 4–5. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. at 2 (explaining that five core principles of financial data sharing—Control, 
Access, Transparency, Traceability, and Security—guide and represent FDX’s 
understanding of the key elements of secure and visible data sharing). 
342 Id. at 5. 
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membership includes 72 members, compared to just 23 at its 2018 launch.343 
Similarly, between January 2019 and April 2020, the number of U.S. customers that 
the FDX API serviced grew from 2 to 12 million.344 Plaid, which has launched Plaid 
Exchange, hoped to become the U.S. platform that enables open banking across the 
country, serving the biggest, as well as mid-sized, banks.345 
 
IV.  MORE ON REGULATING CONSUMER DATA SHARING 
 
Different from the bottom-up, market-based American approach, the EU has 
adopted a top-down approach to consumer data.346  The PSDII, which has been 
described in a headline as “EU Fires [the] Starting Gun for Banks vs. Fintech Fight 
over Payments,” encourages technological developments that disrupt existing 
businesses. 347  It requires, however, using a Secure Customer Authentication 
(“SCA”), “which authenticates the identity of” customers “and their right to make” 
transactions, prior to making electronic payments.348 SCA is based on the use of two 
or more elements: (i) knowledge (something only users know); (ii) possession 
(something only users possess, such as cell phones that can receive codes); and/or 
(iii) inherence (something only the users have, such as fingerprints).349 
But the PSDII is not weakness-free. Its legally binding uni-directional flow of 
data is not only unfair to banks but also does not serve consumers well. 350 
Additionally, the PSDII is limited—it only focuses on payments and does not cover 
all consumer data or even other consumer financial data, such as mortgages or 
savings.351 And since the EU’s approach is top-down, its weaknesses are not likely 
                                                   
343 The Financial Data Exchange Reports Strong First-Year Growth; Now Protecting 
Online Financial Data for Five Million Consumers, Including Business Customers, Through 




345 See Karvounis & Dhillon, supra note 166. 
346 See PSDII, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35, supra note 14. 
347 Huw Jones, EU Fires Starting Gun For Banks vs. Fintech Fight over Payments, 
REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-payments-regulations/eu-
fires-starting-gun-for-banks-vs-fintech-fight-over-payments-idUSKBN1DR1AZ [https:// 
perma.cc/5NV8-QTJ7]. 
348 Alan Brener, Payment Service Directive II and Its Implications, in DISRUPTING 
FINANCE: FINTECH AND STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 103, 115–16 (Theo Lynn & John 
G. Moody eds., 2019). 
349 Payment Services Directive: Frequently Asked Questions, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 12. 
2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5793_en.htm [https://perma.cc/GP 
28-ZLZ5]. 
350 See Seismic Shift, supra note 18. 
351 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 58, at 5 (“[T]he EU’s . . . 
PSD2 . . . appl[ies] only to specific types of data, like payments processing data.”). 
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to be addressed quickly, and it is hard to see how industry participants’ initiatives 
could modify the binding compliance standards or change the legal status quo.  
The U.S. should regulate consumer financial data sharing in order to address 
key issues that should not be left unsolved. These include the problem of consumers’ 
fictional consent, data and financial liability issues, data security risks, and even 
systemic risk, in addition to innovation and competition-related concerns. Without 
such regulation, the U.S. can find itself in a world where Visa and MasterCard own 
the biggest data aggregators, as a result of transactions that mainly benefit big 
banks.352  
Additionally, regulating data aggregators and data sharing could also help 
address other issues relevant to the financial industry, such as data aggregators’ 
operation as gatekeepers of FinTech operations and the possibility of banks’ 
operating as platforms, as further explained in this section. 
 
A.  Rating Agencies—An Analogy 
 
Broad access to financial data increases the chance that information may be 
lost, stolen, or misused by data aggregators. Thus far, regulators have ignored data 
aggregators’ activities and the risks associated with them. However, if Visa and 
Mastercard were to own the biggest data aggregators, they would essentially become 
the gatekeepers and the toll collectors for all types of FinTech and open-banking 
operations.353 Therefore, the potential acquisitions of large data aggregators should 
matter to regulators, along with the way data aggregators conduct their operations 
and how those operations impact consumers and the financial system.  
Regulating data aggregators’ operations is not necessarily bad for business. 
Lighter-touch regulation also played a key role in the 2008 financial crisis. In 
particular, the major rating agencies (“RAs”)—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and 
Fitch—contributed to the crisis with their high ratings of residential mortgage-
backed securities that facilitated the development of a bubble. Once it burst, 
disastrous consequences led to the post-crisis regulation of RAs.354 RAs prepare, 
publish, and maintain credit ratings on investments. Companies that issue securities 
want a rating from the RAs in order to better market their securities, increase their 
offering price, or fulfill contractual requirements posed by actors with whom they 
transact.355 In our signaling economy, these ratings inform institutional investors 
whether investments are sound, and so investors highly consider the opinions of RAs 
                                                   
352 See Crosman, Mastercard and Visa Gobble Up, supra note 34. 
353 Id. 
354 See JOSEPH C. LONG, MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, 12A BLUE 
SKY LAW § 9:154 (2010) (updated June 2020). 
355 Id. 
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who function as gatekeepers. 356  The three big RAs determine businesses’ 
creditworthiness.357 
In an era where data aggregators have essentially become the gatekeepers of 
consumer financial data, their interaction with financial institutions and FinTech 
companies should be regulated, even if the data aggregators mainly function as 
middlemen. RAs, for example, are also gatekeepers that usually do not issue or sell 
securities themselves. But, courts have determined that their ratings of securities can 
be viewed as de facto false statements of fact, even if they are usually held to be 
professional opinions.358 Opinions, much like facts, can be substantially incorrect or 
misleading and thus must adhere to the same legal standards.359 Therefore, while 
RAs usually only assign ratings on securities issued by other entities, they can still 
face secondary liability under blue sky laws, state common law, and even primary 
scheme liability. Secondary liability attaches to any participant that helps security 
sellers, including the assignment of ratings that induce investors to buy securities.360 
This could be somewhat analogous to data aggregators arguing that the apps they 
helped connect to banks are at fault for potential risks that materialized and the 
damage that resulted. Rather, secondary liability should attach to data aggregators if 
they helped FinTech companies gain access to financial data, and the FinTech 
companies then took advantage of the data in an illegal or harmful way. 
Likewise, the common law recognizes claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation against RAs. Specifically, RAs are subject to a common law cause 
of action if they give ratings without exercising reasonable care that the investor then 
reasonably relied upon.361  The proof standard for a negligent misrepresentation 
argument is favorable for investors as the standard is lower than scienter.362 This 
common law theory, with some changes, can be useful in thinking of ways to 
regulate data aggregators’ interactions with financial institutions and FinTech 
companies, in connection with their commitment to consumer protection principles. 
                                                   
356 See, e.g., J&R Mktg., SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 393 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(describing credit-rating agencies as financial market gatekeepers). 
357 See LONG, KAUFMAN & WUNDERLICH, supra note 354. 
358 See, e.g., Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance 
Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 775 (1st Cir. 2011) (outlining instances in which an opinion may be 
held as false or misleading). 
359 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 
U.S. 175, 179 (2015) (interpreting Section 11 of the 1933 Act); NNN Durham Off. Portfolio 
1, LLC v. Grubb & Ellis Co., No. 12-CVS-3945, 2016 WL 7489690, at *26–27 (N.C. Sup. 
Ct. 2016) (interpreting the North Carolina Securities Act). 
360 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enter., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 649–50 (S.D. 
Ohio 2008) (describing Ohio blue sky laws). 
361 See, e.g., Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 827–28 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (sustaining claim against credit rating agency for California common law 
negligent misrepresentation); King Cnty., Washington v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 
708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 336–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (sustaining claim against credit-rating agency 
under New York common law fraud). 
362 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enter., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 640–44. 
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Data aggregators, as gatekeepers of consumer data, should be subject to a common 
law claim if they facilitate, without exercising reasonable care, transactions that 
caused harm between financial institutions and FinTech companies that do not meet 
certain pre-determined standards. 
The focus on potential harm is key. The greater the amount of consumer 
financial data held by data aggregators, the greater the possible harm to consumers 
resulting from a data breach.363 Currently, data aggregators are not subject to a 
particular regulatory scheme similar to financial institutions. In addition to state 
consumer protection laws, data aggregators are only subject to generic federal 
consumer protection laws, which the FTC enforces. 364  Thus, the absence of 
regulatory oversight of data aggregators and the flow of consumer financial data via 
FinTech apps raise major risks for consumers,365 especially, as the data aggregators’ 
security practices are not comparable to financial institutions’ standards and the 
FinTech apps third-party providers’ security practices are even weaker.366 
The provisions in the GLBA govern how financial institutions367 must use 
certain tools to ensure the security and confidentiality of customer data, safeguard 
against any foreseen harms, and shield against unapproved access to databases and 
systems.368 Financial institutions are required to describe their practices to clients, 
and show how their institutions’ data security plans and policies are protecting 
confidential information.369 The federal banking agencies, the SEC, CFTC, and the 
FTC enforce the GLBA.370 As part of its enforcement, the FTC stated the primary 
information security provisions in its Safeguards Rule,371 which requires financial 
institutions to evaluate and create a clear security plan that details an entity’s 
business strategy in connection with guarding customer data, including detecting 
and managing system failures. 372  Referring to data aggregators and FinTech 
                                                   
363 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 37 (“In outreach meetings with Treasury, 
data aggregators have asserted that they mitigate data breach risk by only retaining 
aggregated and anonymized data that is not associated with any personally identifiable 
information of the consumer.”). 
364 To the extent that data aggregators or FinTech companies are providing services to 
a bank, the services provided are subject to the third-party oversight framework imposed by 
banking regulators under the Bank Service Company Act. See Bank Service Company Act, 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1861–67; AM. BANKERS ASS’N, FINTECH—PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE 
INNOVATION 8 (2018), https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/Documents/fintech-treasury-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDG2-3WXZ]. 
365 AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 364, at 3–4.  
366 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 37. 
367  Under the GLBA, financial institutions include companies that offer consumer 
financial products or services like loans, financial or investment advice, or insurance. 15 
U.S.C § 6827(4)(B). 
368 Id. § 6801(b). 
369 Id. § 6803(c)(3). 
370 2018 Treasury Report, supra note 52, at 39. 
371 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805(b); 16 C.F.R. pt. 314 (2002). 
372 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.3–.4 (2002). 
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companies, the FTC has noted that both entities offer financial services and products 
as financial institutions under GLBA and are subject to its rules.373 
Becoming more aware of the concerns associated with consumer data sharing, 
the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on November 21, 2019, 
that included the following two new legal initiatives: (i) The Safeguarding Non-
Bank Consumer Information Act, H.R. ____, which seeks to clarify GLBA’s privacy 
provisions and give the CFPB authority over the Safeguards Rule; and (ii) the 
Financial Information Data Modernization Act, H.R. ____, which seek to clarify 
“non-financial institutions” and “financial data” for the protection of the consumer 
under the GLBA.374 The hearing focused on how big technology firms, which have 
increasingly entered the financial industry, are subject to an unclear legal 
framework, compared to financial institutions.375 For example, how big technology 
platforms’ consumer data has “been utilized for credit underwriting [decisions], 
discriminatory housing advertisements, and other purposes.”376 
The hearing addressed the need for a federal regulation.377 In the absence of 
such regulation, the complex and inconsistent regulatory environment may 
jeopardize the country’s position as a global leader in technology and add undesired 
complexities and inefficiencies.378 The patchwork benefits mainly the multimillion-
dollar data compliance industry and puts small business owners and entrepreneurs 
at a disadvantage,379 causing them to become more dependent on bigger, wealthier 
players. Otherwise, if small business owners fail to comply with regulations, the cost 
will be high,380 and consumers will see the direct effects. Hence, we need a federal 
law that offers a reliable set of standards for online as well as offline businesses, 
                                                   
373 Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards 
Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/financial-institutions-customer-information-complying [https://perma.cc/ 
E4SE-2FP8] (stating that the Safeguards Rule applies to companies that receive information 
about the customers of other financial institutions). 
374 Banking on Your Data: The Role of Big Data in Financial Services: Hearing Before 
the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. (2019) (memorandum by Fin. Servs. Comm. Majority 
Staff), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-20191121-sd002 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ T8GY-PHP3]. 
375 Id. 
376 Id. (quotation omitted). 
377 See Michael Beckerman, Americans Will Pay a Price for State Privacy Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/state-privacy-
laws.html [https://perma.cc/LX6D-5FCF] (explaining that states are rushing to pass their 
own legislation, creating a patchwork of privacy laws, as the modern data economy is too 
big to regulate at the state level). 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
380 A study by IBM Security and the Ponemon Institute showed that the global average 
cost of a data breach is $3.92 million. 2019 Cost of a Data Breach Report, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach [https://perma.cc/36GL-DVTZ] (last visited July 
7, 2020). At $8.19 million, the U.S. had the highest average cost in the world. Id. 
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irrespective of where their users are located,381  that would offer safeguards for 
consumers and predictability for companies.382 
Any such federal-level regulation of data aggregation should be analogous in 
some respects to RAs regulation as gatekeepers and may involve tasking data 
aggregators with managing digital identities too.383  This would mean providing 
digital versions of individuals’ identities, thereby replacing identity cards, which 
people typically carry with them. Witnessing the growing marketplace for digital 
identities, various entities already use some type of digital identity to verify payment 
data or offer different services.384 In terms of efficiency, data aggregators, with API-
enabled access to customer data from the different financial players across the 
market, will perform processes needed for digital identities’ verification faster, more 
effectively, and at lower costs.385 
 
B.  Open Banking: A Platform–Like Business Model? 
 
Mandatory open banking initiatives can push banks to involuntarily become 
“Platform as a Service” kind of providers.386 Operating as a platform that relies on 
APIs might benefit all stakeholders. Banks could securely and quickly exchange data 
                                                   
381 Discussing this issue in the context of banks, see, e.g., Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. 
Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[When banks] are unable to operate under 
uniform, consistent, and predictable standards, their business suffers, which negatively 
affects their safety and soundness.”). 
382  See, e.g., Howard H. Stevenson & Mihnea C. Moldoveanu, The Power of 
Predictability, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 1995), https://hbr.org/1995/07/the-power-of-
predictability [https://perma.cc/VB9W-4WLU] (discussing how implementing measurable 
and predictable business practices can assist in creating certainty and improving businesses). 
383  Erin Jane Illman, Data Privacy Laws Targeting Biometric and Geolocation 
Technologies, 73 BUS. LAW. 191, 194–95 (2018).  
384 Id. at 195 (“As companies look to the future, many believe that drivers’ licenses, 
passports, and other forms of identification will be replaced with digital identification that 
can be accessed and verified from anywhere in the world with a single fingerprint or eye 
scan.”).  
385 Realizing this potential, in January 2020, news broke of Visa’s interest in purchasing 
Plaid for $5.3 billion. See Morris & Roberts, supra note 41 (“Plaid occupies a gatekeeper 
role between conventional banks and the app-based upstarts—including Venmo, Chime, 
Coinbase and Robinhood—trying to disrupt them.”). 
386  “PaaS, or Platform-as-a-Service, is a cloud computing model that provides 
customers a complete platform—hardware, software, and infrastructure—for developing, 
running, and managing applications without the cost, complexity, and inflexibility of 
building and maintaining that platform on-premises.” Sunil Joshi, PaaS (Platform-as-a-
Service), IBM, https://www.ibm.com/blogs/cloud-computing/2014/02/what-is-platform-as-
a-service-paas/ [https://perma.cc/4PMC-XNQF] (last visited July 7, 2020); see also NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING 2–3 (2011). 
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with third-parties, and profit from it.387 Similarly, allowing users to interact with 
banks as platforms by incorporating APIs would allow third-parties to plug straight 
into the relevant code, historical information, and data feeds. Moreover, parties 
could connect, integrate, create, and exchange value,388 as banks would function like 
matchmakers, integrating all parties, 389  enabling data aggregators to empower 
consumers by letting them monitor all accounts simultaneously.390 
Some banks have started to consider the platform/integration concept. 391 
Information economy companies such as Google, Netflix, Uber, Airbnb, Facebook, 
Instagram, Amazon, eBay, Alibaba, and even PayPal have all transitioned into 
models where they engage in e-commerce using APIs that connect smartphones, and 
integrate data analytics, cloud computing, AI, and social-production.392 Among the 
                                                   
387 Falon Fatemi, How APIs Can Transform Your Company, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2019, 
3:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/falonfatemi/2019/03/21/how-apis-can-transform-
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for the free flow of data.” Id. 
391 In April 2019, Goldman Sachs announced its plans to start integrating between 
developers and its clients. “The bank is also offering engineers $100,000 to build new 
applications using the bank’s code. . . . By letting outsiders tinker with its code, Goldman 
hopes to . . .  earn the loyalty of computer-driven ‘quant’ traders . . . .” Liz Hoffman, 
Goldman’s Trading Floor Is Going Open-Source–Kind Of, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2019, 9:01 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldmans-trading-floor-is-going-open-source-kind-of-
11554285602 [https://perma.cc/F6LW-UGEG]. Similarly, JPMorgan recently started 
permitting customers to use certain features of its trading engine. Hugh Son, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. Recently Began Allowing Clients to Use Some Features of Athena, Its Trading 
Engine, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2018, 10:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/05/jp-morgan-
selling-trading-software-in-glimpse-of-wall-streets-future.html [https://perma.cc/D9RA-
7XE4]. Likewise, Bank of America introduced a new digital dashboard designed to make it 
easier for entrepreneurs to manage their financials. Bank of America Introduces New Digital 
Tools for Small Business, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/press-
releases/2019-02-06/bank-of-america-introduces-new-digital-tools-for-small-business 
[https://perma.cc/74YV-N8E7]. 
392 See, e.g., José Manuel de la Chica, PSD2 and Open APIs in Banking: Is This the 
Start of the Exponential Era in FinTech and Online Payments, BBVA (June 3, 2016), 
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model’s advantages are the higher rate of apps, both in terms of quantity and 
development speed.393 Moreover, banks that would adopt this model would be able 
to monetize the APIs in the digital-economy, through which outside innovators can 
develop API-consuming apps and pay fees in order to use the API.394 Lastly, for 
banks, the adoption of a platform model might prove to be superior to other models 
as it could result in lower transaction costs economics.395 Operating as a platform, 
banks can reduce searching, matching, negotiation, and contracting costs,396 and 
lower information asymmetries.397 
Realizing these benefits, data aggregators do not want to be left behind and 
miss this opportunity to serve as a middleman. Therefore, they have initiated ways 
to stay relevant, such as supporting the biggest banks in their own created systems. 
For example, in 2019, JPMorgan Chase entered into an agreement with a leading 
data aggregator that addresses some concerns relating to sharing financial data.398 
According to the agreement, customers provide their consent to share data with any 
                                                   
https://bbvaopen4u.com/en/actualidad/psd2-and-open-apis-banking-start-exponential-era-
fintech-and-online-payments [https://perma.cc/A6Q7-RP45]; PARKER, ALSTYNE & 
CHOUDARY, supra note 388, at 2. 
393 Platforms offer a scalable route for faster development. As an example  
 
[C]onsider the case of iPhone as a product platform. Apple would have never been 
able to develop such an immense number of applications by using their 
organisational resources alone. Instead, by opening up their product and making 
its features available to an entire community of developers through open APIs, 
they managed to unlock new sources of value at a much higher rate both in terms 
of quantity . . . but also in terms of speed . . . and scope . . . . 
 
Markos Zachariadis, Pinar Ozcan & Dize Dinckol, The Economics and Strategy of 
Platforms: Competing in the Era of Open Banking, in THE BOOK ON OPEN BANKING 59, 61 
(2018).  
394 Hoffman, supra note 391. Specifically, 
 
Goldman has written hundreds of code snippets, known as APIs, that allow users 
to plug straight into Marquee. They can tap Goldman’s historical data to find out 
whether a trading strategy would actually make money and assemble customized 
baskets of securities to hedge their portfolios. Many of these APIs will be 
available on GitHub. 
 
Id.  
395 Ronald Coase constructed society’s understanding of the role of transaction costs. 
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (6th ed. 2003) (stating that “new 
law and economics” began with Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1 (1960), and Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961)). 
396 See Zachariadis & Ozcan, supra note 155, at 9. 
397 Id.  
398 See Increase Customers’ Control, supra note 60. 
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particular FinTech app, and using the bank’s platform, access a transparent 
dashboard with the types of information that can be shared about them and decide 
what to share with which app.399 Likewise, addressing concerns regarding the extent 
of permission, using token-based security in the secure API400 enables JPMorgan 
Chase to share only the type of data that the FinTech app or third-party needs and 
only from accounts specified by customers. 401  The third-party will use the 
information to help customers make better, more informed decisions about their 
accounts, and customers will be able to see which third-parties got linked to their 
accounts and cancel access to apps at any time.402 
But, the bank platform-model option has weaknesses too, and so without 
regulation requiring it, it is not clear how broadly adopted it would ever be. First, as 
discussed above, for resources-related reasons, smaller banks are unable to adopt it 
as easily, but without it will not be relevant.403 Thus, for such mid-size and smaller 
banks, solutions like Plaid’s “API connectivity in a box” would be ideal. Second, 
adopting such a model could be a bad strategic move for some of the big banks, as 
they could unintentionally give rise to competitors or not notice new services built 
on their technology that they have spent a long time creating and designing.404 For 
example, Zynga, maker of the FarmVille game, created its online-gaming empire by 
utilizing Facebook’s technology and users.405 Similarly, Uber utilized Google Maps 
to enable its drivers to find their way while navigating.406 Lastly, there might be 
some merit in the FinTech companies’ arguments against limiting the scope of the 
permission to data they are granted and its impact on innovation. 
  
                                                   
399 Id. 
400 See Crosman, Data-Sharing Debate, supra note 35. Crosman notes, 
 
Users can set those tokens to expire or delete, or modify them through the 
bank website. . . . The tokenization means “you’re not typing your user name and 
password into the aggregator’s service and giving them credentials[.]” . . . The 
user logs in to the aggregator and is redirected to the bank account to authorize 
the aggregator to do certain things. . . . “Standing on the shoulders of OAuth is 
really good idea, [sic] because it’s a robust standard that’s used in many places.” 
 
Id. (quoting Joseph Lorenzo Hall, chief technologist and director of the internet architecture 
project at the Center for Democracy and Technology in Washington). 
401 Id. 
402 See id. 
403 See Shevlin, supra note 121. 
404 Id. See Shevlin, Plaid Launches API Exchange, supra note 161. 
405 See Dean Takahashi, How Zynga Grew from Gaming Outcast to $9 Billion Social 
Game Powerhouse, VENTURE BEAT (Dec. 12, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://venturebeat.com/20 
11/12/12/zynga-history/view-all/ [https://perma.cc/SAG3-G3ZY].  
406 See FDX, supra note 338, at 7. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Customers should have control of their data, and manage it as they see fit, but 
there are many risks associated with doing so, especially when dealing with financial 
data. Therefore, any attempt to regulate the management of consumer financial data 
requires careful tiptoeing around the issue, as laws that emphasize privacy and data 
security could result in creating difficulties for consumers to access their 
information. However, despite the potential harms, consumer financial data should 
not be a battleground among banks, FinTech companies, and data aggregators. If 
managed properly, data sharing could turn into a consumer empowering tool that 
offers innovative services and products, 407  while complying with principles of 
consumer protection and systemic risk. 
Consumer financial data should be shared in a safe, secure, and symmetrical 
way, based on clear, logical, and widely accepted standards of operation outside of 
the siloed approach that is currently still adopted in the financial services industry.408 
Smartphones and apps are not going away.409 The open banking trend, driven by 
customer-permissioned sharing of data, created and enabled by the proliferation of 
smart devices, has the potential to transform banking services and banks’ business 
models. And banking might be just the beginning. Indeed, if we get this singular 
consumer right in the banking context, we might be able to even go further to include 
telco and utility data. After all, banking is different from other industries, and 
innovative changes taking place in other sectors with respect to data sharing might 
be dangerous to adopt in the banking industry. As banks innovate and try to stay 
relevant, it is important that regulators and businesses remember that. 
While industry consortia or the adoption of a platform model could help create 
the open banking common definitions and standards that are needed in order to make 
data sharing usable, a market-led solution will not be enough. The CFPB must 
develop a carefully designed, thoughtful regulation, which will prioritize 
consumers’ interests and make data sharing transparent, but not overly taxing for 
consumers to understand and consent to. 
Data aggregators would benefit from regulation that anchors them as the key 
financial players they have become in the U.S., with rights and obligations as 
gatekeepers that bridge between FinTech companies and banks, even in a futuristic 
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era in which screen-scraping would be less used. Banks, which must adapt to the 
new ecosystem, could also benefit from working with FinTech companies to 
improve and enrich their offered products and services. Operating as a platform 
might not be such a bad thing for big banks, and more importantly, working with 
FinTechs would enable banks to get more timely, relevant, and quality data, than 
they currently have access. For example,  
 
The ability to update data when it’s available is a win for banks that want 
to use timely data from other institutions’ accounts. But . . . if customers 
don’t log in, updates from the aggregated banks don’t happen, and banks 
don’t see the transaction data from other institutions until the customer 
logs in again.410 
 
Lastly, carefully designed regulation will empower consumers, help them gain legal 
control over their data, benefit from increased competition, and enjoy innovative 
products and services. This does not need to be tolling for consumers. There are 
ways to offer more transparency and guidance in order to obtain informed consent 
to data sharing, without drowning consumers in lengthy detailed explanations and 
warnings. The CFPB’s structure and actions might face some challenges, but the 
bureau has proven itself as highly effective in enforcing financial protection laws, 
and succeeding in enforcement actions,411 which are key in order to get consumer 
financial data sharing right. 
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